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# ***JPRS Report—***

# **Central Eurasia**

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***Military Affairs***

# Central Eurasia

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-93-023

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7 July 1993

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## CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

### 14th Army Commander Lebed Interviewed

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No 3, 93 (Signed to press 16 Feb 93) pp 46-51

[Interview with 14th Army Commander Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Ivanovich Lebed by ARMIYA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Gavrilov, under the rubric: "Permit Us to Introduce": "Lieutenant-General A. Lebed: 'Where'd You Get the Idea That I Live Life on the Edge...'" ]

[Text] An athletic figure, a serious, unblinking stare, maximum self-discipline and confidence... That is from the impressions of the very first minutes of my acquaintance with the 14th Army commander. The name of Lieutenant-General A. Lebed is well known in the Armed Forces and, yes, perhaps in the entire country. The attitude toward him is complex. But even his most ardent critics would hardly risk denying this man's contribution in resolving the bloody fratricide in the Dniester Republic. The belligerent parties have been separated and the "fire has been extinguished" in this "hot spot" largely thanks to the efforts of this stern general who does not tolerate diplomatic half tones. Unfortunately, in one of the many "hot spots" that are currently scattered throughout the territory of the former Union. Magazine Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Gavrilov met with Lieutenant-General A. Lebed in Tiraspol and asked him to respond to several questions.

[Gavrilov] Aleksandr Ivanovich, please recall July 1992. At that time the gaze of the entire world was fixed on the Dniester Republic. Many people were afraid that the army would be drawn into the conflict. And suddenly the news—you are becoming the commander of the 14th Army. And several days later, your statement... It rang out like thunder in a clear sky. The majority of simple people and practically the entire Armed Forces perceived it with understanding. They perceived the main thing in it—the pain of a Russian officer for the innocent victims whose blood had been spilled in vain. How did the thought arise to issue that statement?

[Lebed] I arrived in the Dniester Republic on the 23rd of June and became the Army Commander on the 27th. I had traveled a lot and had seen a lot by the beginning of July. I understood that not nearly an interethnic conflict was raging here as they had attempted to portray it. There is no interethnic conflict here. The composition of the population on both banks of the Dniester is identical. While studying this senseless war, I perceived the main thing: we needed to find a suitable table, a big fist and we needed to strike the table with that fist... So that everything immediately became clear to everyone. All of the processes in the Dniester Republic had taken their course. No one had attempted to stop the war—either by political or military means. Hard workers from both sides were sitting in the trenches. They didn't need that war but they were fighting. With all of their proletarian

hatred... I ran through a mass of versions and decided on the one that would drastically sober up everyone. Hence this statement arose.

[Gavrilov] The language of the statement was very unusual—strong, abrupt turns of speech, emotional saturation with an extremely compressed form. Did you write it yourself or did you resort to the assistance of a professional man of letters or journalist?

[Lebed] I take advantage of the services of an assistant only when I need to prepare speeches for anniversaries. I write everything serious myself. The outline of that statement is here in my notebook... I think that no one will say it better than me in such cases. And to explain to someone what I want to say or to wrangle with some assistant or other—is an intolerable waste of time... The language of that statement is mine. I can say that without false modesty.

[Gavrilov] You obviously understood very well what this statement could have turned into for you personally? It is rumored that soon after that some one of the country's leadership crossed you off a list to receive the next general's rank. Yes and the minister of defense, who respects and values you, later rebuked you for your lack of political flexibility and complained that the statement was the result of an emotional outburst... Well, did you really get it good?

[Lebed] That did in fact occur. The President personally crossed my name off the list... But I didn't "get it good" and I couldn't have "gotten it good". For a long time now, I haven't had any fears in that regard. I will attempt to explain why. In 1988, I became the commander of an airborne division. I introduced my units into Sumgait and later into Tbilisi, Baku, and other no less "nice" places. And each time that was carried out, I think, in a very despicable manner. I received the mission to operate "according to the southern version": aircraft armadas took off, regiments were airlifted to the southern territories, they were landed and they began to operate. And always one and the same plan: neither a written order, a specific mission, nor an explanation for you of the procedures or how they must be conducted. Neither an explanation of the difference between special martial law or a state of siege. I still haven't figured out just what that is. Neither the rights nor the obligations... I issued the order to fire, I was incorrect. I didn't issue the order to fire, I was once again incorrect... Well since that is so, I didn't have any complexes whatsoever left. I thought: I have arrived, I have sorted out the situation, I have made a decision and I have begun to act. If I have acted incorrectly, you recall me and sort it out. And I will explain why I acted in that manner and not in some other way. In general, as you know, they don't judge the victors. And somehow it is not customary to curse me...

[Gavrilov] About your interrelations with the Minister of Defense. At Ryazan Airborne School, Platoon Commander Lieutenant Grachev had a Deputy Sergeant Lebed, Regimental Commander in Afghanistan Colonel

Grachev had Battalion Commander Major Lebed, yes and later fate repeatedly brought you back together. Was that simply a coincidence?

[Lebed] Actually, the Minister and I have spent all but two years of our entire service paths side by side. And Officer and later General Grachev knew very well that Officer and later General Lebed would never let him down. You need to seek the answer to your question somewhere on that plane.

[Gavrilov] Recently, we often hear that the army must remain outside politics. However, the Russian Armed Forces are still frequently utilized precisely as a power political instrument. For example, your mission to the Dniester Republic—what is it but politics in a pure form?

[Lebed] In the current situation, the statement that the army must remain outside politics smacks of hypocrisy. For that simple reason that the army, at least the majority of the officers who serve in it, would be happy to find themselves outside politics but that can occur only in that successful state. In a state where the army is involved only with its own affairs—combat training, where officers serve according to regulations, where they have everything. In that state, you won't be able to drive the military into politics with a stick... And you will agree there is politics at every step in our country... The apartment issue—politics, the transfer of an officer to some other army—politics, a transfer to a new duty location—politics, the attitude toward the army in a number of regions—pure politics. In some places, they are attempting to utilize the army as a power instrument and in some places they are picketing military garrisons and they are stealing weapons... Take the Dniester Republic. Here it wasn't mainly thieves who were stealing weapons. Ordinary people were stealing—from patriotic motives... At the present time, to attempt to portray the army outside politics is an unrealistic dream that will not soon become a reality.

[Gavrilov] Therefore, you don't have any illusions whatsoever on that score?

[Lebed] I personally am not convinced that I will live to see those times. And one more thing. I have repeatedly asked the highest leaders to eliminate the need for me to make political decisions. I have insisted that a diplomat or politician would stand ahead of me to resolve all of these problems and I would be involved with my affairs. But they haven't listened to me. And here I am a jack of all trades—army commander, senior military leader and so forth... I meet with all commissions, delegations, and missions, including representatives of the UN and the CSCE [Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe]. But no one has taught me the subtleties of politics and diplomacy. I can only be guided by common sense, as they say, and rely on good luck... Well, if that is so, I will not play up to anyone and I will begin to act as I consider it necessary in a given situation. And thank God, so far I haven't been mistaken...

The statements on the separation of the army from politics have certainly been caused by one other thing—by the fear of a certain stratum that has ruined a great country, has brought its population to the brink of poverty and has reduced the army to defeat and collapse. Let's recall the idiosyncrasies with the troop withdrawals from abroad. No other civilized country would have done that. But in our country—please... And today when a critical mass of indigent officers who have neither house nor home has been created on Russia's territory, all of this pseudo-democratic social stratum has simply become frightened. So, while the army is not involved with its own affairs and is at "hot spots", gathering the harvest, collecting scrap metal, or "a plug in any small hole", it is impossible to separate it from politics.

[Gavrilov] What do you think, why was it you—a combat general—Afghan vet—who was appointed 14th Army Commander?

[Lebed] Honestly speaking, I flew to the Dniester Republic, not suspecting that I would become the Army Commander. I had an entirely different mission as Airborne Troops Deputy Commander. Now deceased General of the Army Dubynin made me an unanticipated proposal. Since I am an officer, I accepted it... No one convinced me of anything. I think that if the state said "you need to", you go without reflecting. Maybe that appears to be old-fashioned to some people but that is my conviction...

[Gavrilov] Recently, less is being written about the Dniester Republic as a "hot spot". But sometimes an alarming note will flash by in reports. How do you assess the current situation? Have you managed to adequately defuse the situation?

[Lebed] I haven't managed to adequately defuse the situation. Without laying claim to a depth of political analysis, I will permit myself to expound a bit. I saw my mission to stop the war. It has been stopped. The introduction of peacekeeping forces was also ensured. Ten days prior to their introduction, my soldiers stood between the opposing sides in Bender and in other cities and villages. And then, as I see it, an active process of political negotiations had to begin. In order to make a lasting, stable peace here and to conclude some sort of treaties... We need to utilize this completely unique situation when, in contrast to all of the remaining "hot spots", firing has ceased. But there is nothing like that. The impression is being formed that some people have decided: don't touch it, they say, and everything will proceed in and of itself and others, Russia in particular, have sighed with relief and have become involved with other problems. And there are still others who are utilizing this period to discredit the peacekeeping forces. The soldiers from these forces right now frequently simply do not understand why they are in the cities of the Dniester Republic. They see how the Moldovan police and the local militiamen are amusing themselves in Bender and how the "former" enemies greet each other... But all of that is artificial. Certain circles are

simply attempting to bring us to the thought that the peacekeeping forces are unnecessary; they say, you don't need to waste colossal sums on their maintenance but simply withdraw them and put an end to the matter... And thereby create the conditions for a renewal of the conflict.

The politicians haven't resolved anything here.

The unified control commission carried out its functions and exhausted itself long ago. Right now it reminds me of a feeble political float on which a sinker has been hung that is obviously too large. We need to raise the negotiations to the intergovernmental level and involve some international organizations here. But then a UN commission consisting of three members flashed through twice in the Dniester Republic. The first time, when fighting was occurring—they certified that everything was bad. And the second time when the fighting had stopped—they certified that everything was very good. And it disappeared... The CSCE representative arrived and noted that it isn't often that we manage to achieve these results. And he left without apparent consequences... They can once again accuse me of sneaking into politics but what's left? I have consulted with some people here, I read some history books and I arrived at certain conclusions. It would be advisable to utilize Finland's experience in the Dniester Republic. That country was part of Tsarist Russia for 109 years. It had all the attributes of statehood: a parliament, a court, a procurator, and police. Only the currency—was the ruble and the borders were transparent. And until Finland's parliament ratified any decree of the Tsarist parliament, it did not have force on the territory of that country. That is a good example... In short, we need to find some version for resolving this problem. The tragedy that has occurred has formed a chasm between the two banks and he who thinks that peace can be restored without special efforts is profoundly mistaken. Only time will draw the edges of that chasm closer together... And one more thing. All of the political negotiations must mandatorily occur in the presence of the peacekeeping forces. Because if they are withdrawn, the situation here will be entirely different...

[Gavrilov] How are your relations developing with the leadership of Moldova and with the local authorities?

[Lebed] The 21 July Agreement noted that our army is neutral. Therefore, I don't have any contacts with the leadership of Moldova. Perhaps with the exception of the minister of defense. I think that he is a reasonable man. It's another matter that there are enough "hawks" around him... As for the local organs of power, I maintain close relations with them. So, a long commander's path is suggested to me. And I am least of all worried about whether or not this republic has been officially recognized or not... Of course, there are also rough edges in relations, all sorts of things happen, but on the whole—normal contact.

[Gavrilov] How would you assess the activities of our soldiers, warrant officers, and officers in these difficult days?

[Lebed] I have very rarely encountered an "outstanding" rating in the army. But nevertheless in this case I would give my subordinates that rating. This was an army—flesh of its people's flesh. They did everything to defend the peaceful population in that totally wild war which was conducted here...

[Gavrilov] And how are the military collectives living today? How are matters with military training and supply?

[Lebed] Today the military collectives are living their normal lives. There are a mass of problems. We have more than 900 homeless men. The central finance organs have terminated our construction. Nevertheless we have already turned over five apartment buildings. As for combat training, here everything is in order. It has reached the laziest and most sluggish that combat training is nothing abstract but something that, in the current situation, can come in very handy for you literally even tomorrow. And whether you live or die will depend on how prepared you are...

There are problems with the organization of service. But for one reason—there aren't enough soldiers. We received a total of only 10% of the prescribed number of conscripts from Russia. And since we have few people, we have to more often place them on guard duty. Consequently, less time remains for training and so forth. We are wiggling out of the situation by using volunteers. I have in mind extended service military personnel. They have occupied an entire series of vacant positions.

There have been many difficulties with supply. We are having a very difficult time hauling even those crumbs that they allocate to us across the territory of Ukraine. Continuous hassles occur: first you can bring it in then you can't bring it in... Say, not so long ago the last transport movement left for Russia with our equipment. They called me at 2 a.m. from Kharkov and reported: Somehow a Ukrainian flat car had wormed its' way into the transport movement. And the local authorities were demanding that we return that flat car... But there was only a guard detail on the transport movement and there weren't any batteries in the vehicles... What to do? Well, we get these minor, but sufficiently sensitive bites quite frequently from our former brothers.

[Gavrilov] What moods currently predominate among the officers? Do you have many who desire to leave the ranks of the army?

[Lebed] I would point out that today the reverse process has occurred. The primary wave of all of those desiring to leave for the Ukrainian, Belarusian, Tatar, Chuvash, I don't know which others there are, armies has subsided... Our, Russian [rossiyskiye], people have remained. I am not saying—Russian [russkiye]. It is Russian

[rossiyskiye]... An adequate number of officers who are of non-Russian nationalities are serving in the army. That's how it always has been. Russia never has been a state with a single ethnic group. Both the Russian, the Tatar, the Cherkess, and the Yakut have always stood in the same rank in the Russian [rossiyskiye] Army. I don't doubt that they will continue to stand in the same rank. The attempt to tear apart or to separate all of this is completely artificial...

So, I have already taken back approximately 50 officers. I interceded on their behalf and they are once again in the ranks. The majority of these junior officers ended up victims of circumstance: someone left in the heat of the moment, someone refused to take some oath or other and was released. Many left for family reasons... Right now all of them are gradually realizing that the state continues to exist and it needs the army. We have turned all of the army processes upside-down and the youth have begun to return. If there is yet an order on contracts, I will totally man my units with trained and, the main thing—officers who desire to serve.

[Gavrilov] If you were given the opportunity to yourself determine the direction of the further reform of the Armed Forces, with what would you begin?

[Lebed] I think that many people will not like this but nevertheless I will say military reform would not occur in the army that has been entrusted to me. For that simple reason that as the army commander I don't know anything about that reform. And therefore I cannot task my subordinates with any tasks whatsoever or to prompt them toward the achievement of some goals or other. Those general milestones of reform that have been designated don't give us very much... I personally cannot imagine how all of this will occur. Each day officers and soldiers perform their duties and each day we need to train them and to be concerned about supply... In short, a normal process is occurring. It is impossible to be involved with any single problem and "freeze" the others and postpone them for an indefinite time. The solution of all problems must proceed in parallel and that is not at all visible. Therefore, I repeat once again, reform is not occurring...

[Gavrilov] And yet, with what would you begin?

[Lebed] I would begin with what launched these processes in parallel: improvement of the authorized organizational structure, reduction and so forth. At least I think that each superior must receive an order to know what to do and what to strive for albeit for a month, or better yet for six months. If I continue to fantasize, then secondly I would be involved with the problem of daily life. Existence determines consciousness. Having rich experience, I quite accurately know that, if a man has well-supplied rear services, he thinks about his duties. And when he is at the unit, he even thinks he's at home. But when he pays an ungodly amount of money for an apartment, when his children are ill because his home is cold, when he doesn't have the opportunity to acquire

everything that is even absolutely necessary, he stands in the ranks and the following is written on his forehead: with thoughts far from official tasks... Provide for an officer's daily life and he will begin to serve. No matter how difficult or expensive that is, there is no other solution... One more thing. We often have a flag protruding from a map which designates a division but you arrive there and what do you see? A division about which there is an anecdote: "Do you want the division formed up out in the courtyard or outside the door of the office..." So, let there be fewer divisions but let them be full-fledged, combat capable divisions.

I will also say what I would not do within the framework of reform. I would not begin to blindly copy foreign experience and shift to a brigade-corps system... It appears to be very improper that we so openly hang on the Americans' every word. All the more so that economically we are incapable of doing that. We have our own experience that was accumulated over decades and that was tested by the Great Patriotic War. And it is hardly obsolete. Will the entire colossal labor of our scientists and military leaders really now go down the drain? We can break what has been left in our country and not build anything to replace it. I don't think that we can learn very much from the Americans in a military context. When aircraft bomb a sufficiently weak country for a month and a half and later troops attempt to enter there on "tiptoes" and, having heard a couple of rounds go off, once again call in aircraft—there's nothing to learn here... We need to value our native experience. It is our experience that permitted us to plant our victory flag over many capitols of Europe when the destruction of the Fascist plague was required.

Well, and if the thought arose to change the structure of the Armed Forces, then we need to test it beforehand, as they say, and roll metal at exercises and command post exercises...

[Gavrilov] The Russian Army has quite a few glorious traditions which we are now begin to recall. Which of them, in your view, are the most important today?

[Lebed] I don't at all agree that we are only beginning to recall our traditions right now. At least in the airborne troops we have never forgotten them. But we need to speak separately or in general not speak about traditions. This is an integral system and we certainly shouldn't do it with one stroke. To that I must add only that society is not standing still. Consequently, traditions must be changed to a certain degree...

[Gavrilov] Which human and professional qualities do you value in your colleagues? How do you regard careerism and protectionism?

[Lebed] Are you saying that in development of a question about our interrelations with the minister? Well, I have a positive attitude toward careerism and in an equal measure toward protectionism. The army does not need an officer who has just come into the army and who has immediately decided that he will finish his service as

a senior lieutenant—deputy company commander. An officer is simply obliged to be ambitious and proud. He must move from rung to rung on his career ladder while obtaining all of the new stars on his shoulder boards. Then that is a normal officer and normal service. And then the state can think that it has an army. It is in this sense that I have a positive attitude toward careerism. But protectionism...

When I promote an officer, knowing that he has brilliant potential capabilities that are significantly higher than the position that he occupies, that is entirely normal. On the one hand, an officer himself works but, on the other hand, his superior helps him and thus the entire army mechanism is strengthened. People who have high strong-willed and professional qualities occupy posts that are befitting for them and the army is strengthened. The officer corps is the backbone of the Armed Forces. We need to foster and cultivate it...

Many people put another meaning into the concepts of "careerism" and "protectionism". And, of course, if someone advances along the career ladder due to "connections" and becomes a "vertebra", then I have fought against and will fight mercilessly against that kind of protectionism...

As for the qualities that I value in my subordinates, first of all that is professionalism. Even if stones rain down from the sky, an officer is obligated to fulfill his official duties: to command, fire, to drive and so forth no lower than good... The second quality is independence. It's no secret that we have been raised in a system of multi-level coordination. But you frequently need to make a decision right this minute. You made it in 30 seconds—you won. But if you began to pick up the telephone, explaining, coordinating, time has passed and you're in a ditch... An officer should not be afraid of responsibility. Personal courage and civic courage should be organically combined in him. Do you agree that there are people who have personal courage but, in the process, lapse into a panic with the one thought that they will have to independently make some decision or other? But we must first think about duty and later about some possible consequences... Well and besides everything else, an officer—that is bravery, honor, valor and conscience...

[Gavrilov] But have you yourself "pulled from one place to another" a former colleague of yours in the army who has these qualities?

[Lebed] Of course, I have "pulled from one place to another". I have such "proteges". For example, Colonel Yuriy Yuryevich Popov—former airborne division chief of staff. We have already known each other for 23 years. There are also a number of officers in the administration of the army and in units who arrived here after me at my request. That is normal. I know these people and I am prepared to entrust each one...

[Gavrilov] It is thought that right now young people unwillingly enter the army. In your opinion, how will

that attitude be changed in the next few years? How do you regard service on contract?

[Lebed] We conducted an anonymous poll among young soldiers in some units here. And we established the following: 66% of the young men unambiguously want to serve. Another 31% want to serve but with some reservations. Wouldn't you say that service will be reflected in training and will it go in favor of health... And only 3% of conscripts do not want to serve. And therefore, I can arrive at the conclusion: everything depends on how you place the matter. And I unambiguously positively regard contracts. I intend to do it in such a way that I have a competition among conscripts. I will not begin to take just anyone. They will have to still strive for the honor of serving in our army...

Don't think that I am passing off the desired as the actual. We simply need to work and be involved as soldiers everyday. Do you know how I determine—is this a normal situation in a subunit or not? By the gleam in the soldiers' eyes. I arrive at the company, I look, the soldiers' eyes are gleaming, the faces are hale and hearty and washed—everything is in order here. But when everyone is crestfallen and their eyes are lifeless, that means I need to sort out—what is the situation in the collective...

[Gavrilov] But if they would task you to compile a Code of a Professional Soldier, what would you write on the first line of it?

[Lebed] I would write this: "Soldier—you are a professional" ... I would discourse a bit on that theme. Some people understand professionalism as follows: that is when they are paid a lot and work a little bit. But that is really not so. If I am a professional, I must know what I must do. Consequently, there must be a contract where everything is written down in detail and where everything is arranged on the shelves. Say, after some year of service, I will obtain an apartment and I will have some benefits or other... If I perform my duties in an outstanding manner—I have this and that, if I perform my duties well—I have this and that, or if I perform my duties satisfactorily—something else. This all must be reflected in my pocket and in my service promotions. Incidentally, I have repeatedly had the opportunity to meet with professionals from Western armies. Let's take the French. They have a lot of rational things. For example, they earn one hundred arbitrary units and set the average minimum standard of living. Add another 85 units. That is the maximum salary. But if you have fired poorly, 15% down and if you have performed your duties poorly—another 10%. If you got drunk and got into a fight—25%... And it has been lowered to 100%. How much you carry away on payday depends on you personally. When I asked their officers about relations at variance with regulations, they waved their hands: That will cost so much that you will think twice before doing that... In their country, the president of the republic personally gives a patent for command to a regimental

commander. They assemble everyone who has commanded a regiment prior to him and everyone participates in a very beautiful and complex ritual. Try to command poorly after that...

[Gavrilov] If you had free time, to what would you devote it?

[Lebed] Actually, I haven't had any spare time for a long time. I have been working practically without time off since approximately 1988. I have been collecting books all my life and I have a dream of reading them at some time. I have never been to a rest home, I don't like large crowds of people. I spend my leaves in remote places: a tent, fishing pole, and mushrooms...

[Gavrilov] How does your family react to the fact that you are constantly where it is "hot"?

[Lebed] Naturally, without delight, but with understanding. The children know—once father selected this profession, he is obliged to serve. My wife is with me right now. The older children are students. The youngest is in the eighth grade. Will he want to follow in my footsteps? We'll live and we'll see. At least he already doesn't shoot any worse than his dad.

[Gavrilov] At one time, poets, while emphasizing a soldier's bravery, said that he "scorns death". And how do you regard the possibility of departing this life? All the more so that you certainly have had the opportunity to end up in critical situations?

[Lebed] I have a normal attitude toward death. In 1982, three "souls" didn't shoot me from 80 meters but I shot them... Since that time, I have finally become convinced: some people are destined to hang themselves... Therefore I go everywhere calmly. If your time has come—neither a tank nor a DOT [permanent machinegun emplacement] will save you, but if you're destined to live—you'll extricate yourself...

[Gavrilov] Do your officers and you yourself carry weapons? With what type of weapon are you an expert marksman?

[Lebed] No, we don't carry weapons. Right now, that's not necessary. But I have mastered... I am an airborne trooper and all my life they have taught me to use any weapon. And right now I know that I will carry out any exercise with a rifle without difficulty. If I had to go to a combat operations area, I would take my pistol and my AKS [Kalashnikov assault rifle] with a long barrel. I don't consider an assault rifle with a short barrel to be a serious weapon... I can destroy any target with an assault rifle from fifty meters...

[Gavrilov] What sustains you and gives you the strength to live permanently on the edge? What do you believe in?

[Lebed] I have already told you what I believe in. But where did you get the idea that I live on the edge? I consider my life to be absolutely normal. This is that micro-climate to which I have become accustomed, that

crossbar below which I do not intend to descend. That doesn't bother me and I don't waste any additional strength. I am a normal earth man and nothing human is foreign to me...

[Gavrilov] Thanks for the interview.

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### Parental Support For Draft Evaders

*93UM0606B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Jun 93 p 2*

[Article by Oleg Vladykin: "Visits With Summons in Hand Paid to Draftees by the District Militia Officer With Our Correspondent"]

[Text] It looks like a popular song from the twenties, "Oh Vanyek, Don't Go to Be a Soldier" has a chance of becoming a hit for today as well. At least it seems to me that its "anti-mobilization" bravado is similar in spirit to the sentiments of many present draftees and their parents. Recently I was convinced of this as I went around with the district militia officer of the 120th Military Department of the City of Moscow, Senior Lieutenant of Militia Vladimir Furmanov, to the apartments of those young men who for some reason did not report to the military commissariat when summoned. Unfortunately, in none of the homes that we visited did we meet any people who were less than skeptical about military service.

It goes without saying that my joint excursion with the district commander was no accident. From Deputy Military Commissar of the City of Moscow, Col Vladimir Dobrovolskiy, the editors had received information indicating that the young men living in the Southwest Administrative District stood out for having the least eagerness to perform their military duty. So that's where we decided to go, to the District Directorate of Internal Affairs [OUVD]. I wanted to find out how in the prevailing situation the health-care organs are helping to imbue the draftees with respect for the Law of the Russian Federation "On the Military Obligation and Military Service," which took force on 1 March 1993.

Well the fact is that this matter, as it turns out, is quite difficult and ignoble. A certain part of the populace does not at all want to accept the requirements of the new law as applied to themselves. As a result, after several days the desk of the acting deputy chief of the OUVD, the chief of the Public Safety Militia of the Southwest Administrative District Col of Militia Aleksandr Semerok overflowed with lists of draftees who "did not notice" the summons from the military commissariats. Each time [these lists] duplicated practically one for one the lists which had earlier gone out from the local organs of the military directorate. And the district militia commanders plan to go around once again to the familiar addresses.

Vladimir Furmanov also visited places he had been before, in the hope of receiving an explanation of why he was forced to repeat his route. But none was to be found. Fruitless waiting at closed doors of apartments was the order of the day. In the best case he talked with parents of draftees, since during the military draft the boys themselves couldn't be kept at home at any hour of the day. For the most part he had to be content with such explanations from mothers and fathers even in the course of our raid, although it was executed late in the evening.

All parents without exception began with a story about the poor health of their sons. Flat feet, liver colics, serious impairments of visual and auditory functions, other fine-sounding diseases seemingly had befallen the young men en masse right as they attained their 18th year. So why didn't they go to the military commissariat, to officially look into these problems through the medical commission? As a rule the parents response vaguely, "Yes, I guess we should."

But when I asked Lidiya Yuryevna, the mother of draftee Aleksandr Borisov, to tell the truth, would she let her son go into the army if the medical commission certified his absolute health, she agreed to be frank.

"We watch TV, we read the papers. In one place the sailors are dying of hunger, in another some soldier is murdered. We aren't our own enemies . . . We shall say to the last that our son is sick."

Fear at the specter of the army monster, which many of my colleagues were inspired to create for a number of years, even after the lessening of journalistic interest in military writing continues to alarm the imagination of many parents of draftees.

For example, the father of draftee Aleksey Proskurin said "I've got nothing against military service in principle. But not in that sort of army. My son wants to be hired on by the militia."

Well, according to the new Russian legislation, a young man upon reaching age 18 can enter service in the organs of internal affairs and thus free himself from military service. So the militia, in assisting the military commissariats in conducting the draft, in a sense is working to its own detriment, depriving itself of potential cadres. However here again there is a nuance of no little importance. Vasiliy Grigoryevich Proskurin was very surprised when the district commander told him that his son Aleksey would have to work in the internal affairs organs until his twenty-eighth year. And if he was discharged from the militia early, then he would immediately lose his release from military service and again receive a summons from the military commissariat. After learning this, the father of the draftee also remembered Aleksey's diseases.

For the sake of objectivity, I should note that the complex state of affairs surrounding the draft of youth into the Armed Forces of Russia is constantly under the scrutiny of

the local authorities in Moscow. In the Southwest Administrative District, for example, on 14 May there was a session of the prefecture college, where subprefects of the municipal districts and representatives of the organs of internal affairs delivered reports on the work to implement the Law on "Military Obligation and Military Service" and workers of the military commissariat expressed their demands and comments. The progress of the draft is also regularly discussed also in operational conferences. And funds are allocated from the municipal budget for additional wages for the workers of housing organs involved in the initial notification of draftees and delivery of the summons.

But still, some idle efforts cannot be avoided. For instance, they decided recently, for purposes of more dynamic education of the local authorities about the progress of the draft, to send the appropriate information from the military commissariat directly to the municipal districts, bypassing the administrative district and its directorate of internal affairs. But as a result there is now a lack of coordination in the work of the departments.

In the 120th department, the official responsible for organization of work of the district militia officers, Sr-Lt of Militia Valeriy Gerasimov complained that the workers of the military commissariat do not come in contact with the direct executors of their orders. Whether because they are very busy, or because they don't believe it possible, although the commissariat building is no more than 100 meters from the department. But since the guidance from the district directorate of internal affairs in this sphere of activity has become rather general, district militia officers with specific problems are guided only by the lists in hand, which indicate those who have not reported to the military commissariat, and by the duplicate summons. Sometimes this gets them into ridiculous situations.

The only draftee whom I and Sr-Lt of Militia Furmanov found at home, Valeriy Deryugin, was clearly dumfounded when the officer asked why he had not visited the military commissariat. "I was there. I brought a paper saying that I am studying at the institute," stated Valeriy. The inspector could say nothing except: "You'll have to go again. You're still on our lists." And he asked the boy to sign that he had received another summons.

Such confusion occurred during our excursion more than once. Particularly with students of state institutions, who enjoy the right to a draft deferment. Their parents showed me the corresponding documents, which were presented to the military commissariat, but for some reason the latter stubbornly kept putting the boys on the "black" lists. Is it perhaps to signify the scope of the work conducted to keep citizens from avoiding military service? When I ask Lt-Col of Militia Semerok about this, I heard the delicate reply: "We won't rule that out."

In general it is doubtful that such a method will make any marked change in the mood of the populace. Except for the additional nervousness of those who won't report

in anyway, and irritation in those who carry around the duplicate summons, there will scarcely be any result. But surely an energetic administrative prosecution, and in chronic cases criminal prosecution, of those youth who are truly ignoring the insistent roar of the military commissariats would undoubtedly have an effect. Especially since the law directly calls for implementation of such measures, and not endless warnings. Here the work of the mass media might play a vital role, hopefully the opposite of the one they played before. Why don't my colleagues finally notice that great transformations are taking place in the Russian Army, and that it already differs markedly from the Soviet Army? We must help people to rid themselves of fear of serving in the renewed Armed Forces.

#### **Former Officer Big Success as Entrepreneur, Offers to Help Others**

*93UM0606C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*8 Jun 93 p 2*

[Letter to editor by Reserve Capt Viktor Golod entitled: "They Can Do Anything": This Was Said About Us, Comrade Officers"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has more than once published letters from service members after their discharge from military service, after they decided to try their strength in the entrepreneurial field. As a rule they wrote as disappointed people, who had had their fill of the "hardness and deprivation of enterprise." And in general all of their complaints were quite reasonable: indeed, it is not easy to find one's place in the market, the funds to start a business, to pay for bank credits. But the letter published today differs sharply in mood from the earlier ones. Its author, Reserve Captain Viktor Golod from the village of Kezhma in the Krasnoyarsk Kray, is firmly convinced that "They can do anything." This was said about us, comrade officers! "And references to interference and difficulties are only an admission of one's own weakness."

We are printing this letter almost in its entirety:

"I was forced to leave the army in 1979. I don't even remember the reason for the discharge, it was so trumped up and had nothing to do with my discharge. For the times the reason was common enough, as our regimental secretary used to say, "open dissension and a non-party world view."

When I landed in the "civilian world," I found myself quickly. Not much to it, would a good pilot stay unemployed? Up to 1986 I worked in the Krasnoyarsk Directorate of Civilian Aviation, flew a "chopper" to fill the needs of our domestic economy.

A few months later, already in the pensioner ranks, I decided to form my cooperative, "Kupi-Proday" [Buy and Sell]. It was not for me, my hands needed a real job. Thinking it over, I decided, let it be an agricultural cooperative.

Why agricultural? Good question. Especially since it was a pig farm. Before then, I have to admit, I'd only seen pigs in the movies, or on a table in the capacity of sausages and other delicacies. But the very thought that a pilot, an officer, could not master a job was insulting. And finally there was literature, and I could ask the advice of knowledgeable people. I braced myself, scraped up the money in my money box, took a 100-thousand ruble loan at the bank, and "cleared for takeoff." I built two pig sties, a processing shop, a storehouse for the combined feeds, a residence, and a small boiler house. I acquired a tractor and a UAZ panel truck, bought twenty piglets, and the business was on its way.

Of course we worked from dawn to dusk, the whole family. We sold the first lot of meat to the local department of consumer cooperatives. The payment, of course, was disappointingly small. That's where I learned from my own experience that it's much more lucrative not just to produce meat, but to process it and make meat products. In response to my requests to purchase a processing plant I got a lot of offers, but the price they were asking, well I had to back out.

But again the officer's pride won out. What's going on I thought, I'm a pilot after all, I have to make a right decision in the most difficult situations, am I going to back off here? Not me! What was so hard about the sausage equipment that an officer with an engineering education couldn't understand?

Boldness saves the day, and it helps even more in coping with sausage equipment. My crude, as they say jerry-rigged "plant" was a success, it met the health standards, its productivity wasn't bad, and it was small and could fit on a table. With this equipment all by myself I produce 150-200 kilograms of different types of high-quality sausage, which is in high demand—*moskvorets*, *krakow*, *armavir*, *odessa* hunter's sausage. And of course my own family, my wife and five children, have gotten used to delicacies: ham, *karbonat*, sausage, and pate loaf as if there were an everyday thing.

Why am I telling you all this? There is a mass discharge under way in the Armed Forces, and physically strong, educated people are going into the reserve, people who spent years in service in all sorts of jams. I can't deny that despite all this, they might lack a certain psychological readiness for "civilian" difficulties, especially the search for their place in an entrepreneurial field. We have the experience of independent decision-making under our belts, we are accustomed to responsibility, we can find our bearings quickly and correctly in a situation. I am certain everything will go well for you.

And on other thing. If someone wants to take advantage of my work, blueprints, a description of the equipment of my "sausage factory," don't be shy, help yourselves. My address is with the editors. How could I, a pilot and officer, not help?

## CIS: POLICY

### Reasons for Poor Progress of Spring Call-Up

93UM0587B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
1 Jun 93 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Boris Soldatenko: "It Is Impossible to Approach Manning of the Army Based Upon the Residual Principle"]

[Text] How bitter it is to admit but we have already become accustomed to officer sentries and to officer combat crews and to the fact that in other units there are a dozen senior officers for each soldier.

These unpleasant thoughts were brought on by the view of the Moscow City Induction Facility on Ugreshskiy Street, house No. 8. In previous times, here, as they say, you would force your way inside in the days of the draft campaign. Even songs could be heard. And that did occur! But today—practically empty rooms and a deserted yard...

"And meanwhile, if you judge by the documents, we have practically fulfilled the draft plan—91.8% of the new recruits have been drafted," explained Moscow Deputy Military Commissar Vladimir Dobrovolskiy. "And this news has already circulated in much of the mass media. They just don't know the true value of the current percentages..."

Incidentally, last year's draft campaign was also formally concluded successfully. But all of this is associated with difficulty with the total shortage of servicemen in units and subunits. And knowledgeable people explained: we should not delude ourselves with the rosy picture created exclusively by the magic of numbers. In reality, everything is not so.

Well, we will also attempt to look at these "Stakhanovite" percentages from another perspective. And even though this small investigation is purely Moscow, nevertheless it provides a sufficiently complete idea of the course of the draft in general.

So, judging by the documents, on 1 April there were 186,371 conscripts on the books at Moscow's military commissariats. Of them, less than 30% of the total number turned out to be registered with conscription registration districts. Those who have a deferment were not included in the number of the "gray" soldiers mass. Students totaled the lion's share—122,569 men. The remainder—are disabled, convicted or those who are under investigation. As a result, during the spring a total of only several thousand men should have been drafted into the army from the capital. If you take this nearly ludicrous number of "potential defenders of the Homeland" for 100%, it turns out that Moscow's military commissariats have already fulfilled 91.8% of the draft plan. That's the kind of arithmetic...

In fact, it's obvious that there is no need for all of draft age youth to enter the army's ranks at all costs. But there are various types of deferments. One matter is for health reasons. Studies are an entirely different matter. Here, as they say, there are nuances. It's as if those benefits that the Supreme Soviet has granted to students legalized the division of draft-age youth into "whites" and "blacks". Enough has already been said about that. But be that as it may, one toils and the other already has a total guarantee of never having to learn the taste of soldier's porridge. And that injustice corrupts. All the more so that not all of them are becoming students based upon merit. It's no secret for anyone that places at VUZs [higher educational institutions] are sometimes being purchased...

Incidentally. Recall that several years ago not only parliamentarians but military commissariat workers themselves proposed not taking students into the army until they had completed their studies. And draft them for 1.5 years of service already after they have obtained a diploma. During the first 12 months, the VUZ graduate would master a military specialty and during the remaining six months he would complete a special officers school and would receive the initial officer rank. But then again, all of that is in the past, although the idea itself even today appears to be not so bad. If, say, 100 hours of study time is devoted to military disciplines at a military department of an institute, it is six times greater at an officers school. But that is not the only reason. But it was also because military units would not be left without soldiers. I am already not talking about justice.

But for now military units are calling, n... without irony, the recently adopted Law "On Military Conscription and Military Service" "the law on military defectors". And it is obviously just if we once again return to the numbers.

For example, there were 106,516 conscripts on the books in 1989 and only one third of them ended up in the troops. In 1991, the number of those on the books increased to 123,872 men and of them one fifth entered the service. This year generally promises to be a "record" year—they plan to send a total of only several percent of the total number of conscripts to the troops.

Many people think that an army on a contract basis is the only panacea from all of these misfortunes. Judging by the experience of other countries, maybe it also correct. But for now, as far as I can judge, the very legal base of contract service requires serious reworking. If, by way of illustration, the benefits and monetary salaries of those who desire to conclude a contract have been stipulated, not a word has been said anywhere: and what specifically must such a soldier do and what are the circle of his official duties? These duties must be precisely recorded not in interim but in permanent military regulations. But for now...

They told me this story at that same Moscow induction center. Several months ago, 22 men were recruited for contract service in the 201st Division which is deployed in Tajikistan. Of the volunteers, only 12 men remained when the specific conversation came to signing contracts and about their assignment to that "hot spot". Ultimately, only nine signed the contract and were assigned. Two days later two of them returned to Moscow. The reason—unwarranted expectations. "I am a first-class driver-mechanic," one of the "contract signers" said angrily. "Therefore, I don't want to drown all of my experience while washing dishes"...

Well, it's certainly valid although also not indisputable.

And finally a few more words with regard to deferments. As they informed me, besides unofficial, there are also quite a few of the so-called semiofficial methods of evading the draft. According to data of competent organs, a peculiar underground medical center, which for a certain bribe makes an official finding on the impossibility of service in the army, has been created in the capital. On the finding are the visas of rather well-known doctors. Pay and they will make a determination for you based upon your choice! heart disease or schizophrenia. And they will provide consultations on how to conduct yourself so that no military commissariat board will undercut you...

And meanwhile the draft continues. Military commissarial workers are literally undertaking heroic efforts in order to somehow make up for the deficiencies in the army's combat ranks. But they are not all-powerful. It is increasingly clear that the decision on various types of deferments that was made in a populist frenzy at one time today has placed the army in an extremely difficult situation. The first step toward admitting this fact has been made: the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet recently amended the Law "On Military Obligation and Military Service," having repealed a number of grounds for deferments for the draft. But it is already clear right now that these are half-measures.

It is time to finally admit: that if we really want to have a strong, combat capable army, we cannot approach its manning... based upon the residual principle. It's time to finally manifest political will and to shift from words about understanding the Armed Forces' problems to specific actions to resolve them.

## CIS: GROUND TROOPS

### Airborne-Shock Methods of Combat Operations

93UM0542B Moscow VOYENNYY VESTNIK in Russian  
No 2, Feb 93 pp 32-34

[Article by Colonel V. Krivov: "Airborne-Shock Methods of Combat Operations"]

[Text] Instructive experience was accumulated in Afghanistan, over almost ten years of warfare, in waging continuous

and decisive actions in mountainous and mountainous desert terrain, in isolated sectors and in day and at night. The combat missions were accomplished, as a rule, through the integrated application of manpower and equipment combined with all forms of reconnaissance, detailed photographing of the terrain and repeated air drops by subunits with the aim of seizing dominant heights and passes and the use of aviation and artillery as part of reconnaissance-strike and firing systems using aerial spotters and forward artillery observers. So we had to master anew, as they say, the techniques of sweeping combat operations

The essence of it is simultaneous strikes against defending enemy aviation and artillery using motorized-rifle and tank subunits from the front, outflanking and raiding detachments from the flanks and the seizure of important targets and lines by airborne assault from the rear, with the aim of cutting off the area of combat operations from reserves coming up and denying the enemy the ability to withdraw to succeeding lines. Coordinated actions from various directions facilitate the achievement of a comparatively high pace of attack "Gnawing through" the enemy defense and "dislodging" him from the positions occupied are eliminated therein

In practice, a motorized-rifle battalion defending using the method under consideration is reinforced by a tank company, one or two artillery battalions, self-propelled air-defense systems (ZSU-23-4), combat engineer platoons and a squad for radiation and chemical reconnaissance. One of several tactical airborne assaults are landed to assist it—one or two airborne assault companies or a motorized-rifle company from the battalion second echelon. Aviation is allotted for air support, and frequently the forces are quite considerable: a flight each of fighter/bombers and attack aircraft, up to three squadrons of army aviation, two reconnaissance aircraft, a helicopter forward spotter and ten or more transport helicopters for the assault. The planned photographing of the terrain from a helicopter using high-precision photographic gear is also performed five or six hours before the start of battle. The photographs are interpreted, and a photomap plotting board is composed.

The final reconnaissance of the areas of combat operations and landing the tactical airborne assaults is performed by reconnaissance aircraft. The data is transmitted from the aircraft to the battalion command post using a coded large-scale map and a pre-arranged message code, as a rule 3—5 minutes after the detection of the target. The data can also be obtained as a result of the interpretation of the wet negatives (30—35 minutes after the landing of the aircraft at the airfield).

The battalion conducted reconnaissance using its own resources as well. An ORD [detached reconnaissance patrol] (BRD [combat reconnaissance patrol]), using sectors of terrain that were difficult to traverse, penetrated in depth into the enemy defenses before the start

of the offensive, reached an indicated objective or area and set up continuous observation of it. The reconnaissance subunits were very often dropped in the rear by helicopter. The reconnaissance reserve was often used to fight enemy commando and reconnaissance groups in the area of the battalion command post.

The battle started in accordance with the plan. The standard and attached artillery made a surprise fire strike against known targets and areas where the tactical airborne assaults were to be landed. Concentrated fire was directed against individual targets from concealed firing positions using direct and indirect laying. Target designation was accomplished from a spotter helicopter.

With regard to aviation, first a pair of fighters over the area of combat operations dropped aerial illumination bombs to disrupt the possible launches of missiles against the attacking aircraft and combat and assault helicopters. The fire-support fighter/bombers and helicopters then destroyed any enemy fire points that had been ascertained in the area of the assault, striking with aerial bombs and rockets from altitudes out of the reach of the fire of large-caliber machineguns and firearms.

The use of new artillery systems and ammunition for remote mining, as well as the allotment of forward air spotters to the first-echelon battalions, facilitated a rise in the effectiveness of the air and artillery strikes. Artillery spotters with communications gear were placed, as a rule, in the first-echelon companies.

The landing of the tactical airborne assaults was covered by Mi-24 combat helicopters and frontal aviation. Fighter/bombers and attack aircraft were located over the assault area for that purpose. Mi-8MT medevac helicopters were on alert, ready to evacuate the wounded from the battlefield.

Mines posed a particular hazard to the battalion subunits when reaching the designated area. A movement support detachment (OOD) was sent out ahead of them to combat them, most often consisting of two tanks (one with the KMT-5 mine sweeper) and three infantry fighting vehicles. One of them contained the obstacle-clearing group, and the others motorized riflemen to cover the operations of the combat engineers. A tank bridgelayer and engineer obstacle-clearing vehicle were also used.

Outcroppings, large blocks and boulders that hindered movement were blown up using explosive charges, while large rocks were cleared by the engineer obstacle-clearing vehicle. The MTU-20 bridgelayer, able to lay a bridge in four minutes, was used to traverse ravines and ditches, as well as craters formed by the detonation of high explosives.

The reconnaissance and obstacle-clearing group also included tracking and pursuit dogs specially trained to detect mines and high explosives.

The engineer-reconnaissance patrol in an Mi-8T helicopter, for engineer reconnaissance of the route and terrain, performed its tasks in close interaction with the OOD. The patrol at the same time destroyed any enemy high explosive with radio fuzes that were detected using a radio sweep. The helicopter loitered at an altitude of up to two kilometers and a distance of 5—20 km from the OOD.

The battalion first echelon advanced behind the OOD under cover of the aircraft, artillery and tanks. It deployed in battle formation, dismounted and advanced to the attack line in the foothills of the adjoining heights under cover of the infantry fighting vehicles. During that, at places where the terrain allowed, the BTRs and BMPs moved into the train of the motorized riflemen. That made it possible to increase the survivability of the vehicles, make fuller use of their firepower and achieve a higher percentage of target destruction. The combat vehicles in other cases formed armor groups for the companies.

Taking into account the fact that the enemy mined and covered with fire the entrances to defiles, roads and the principal routes in the mountains, the motorized-rifle subunits had to operate chiefly on foot along the ridges and slopes at various levels, designating outflanking detachments that were small in numbers for strikes against the flanks and rear of enemy strongpoints. The tanks, BMPs and BTRs destroyed enemy firepower that became active or was newly discovered at the entrances to defiles and the upper tiers of the defense, thereby facilitating the successful advance of the motorized riflemen.

The method of operations of the company in which one platoon in pre-battle formation proceeded along the lower tier, another along the middle and a third along the crest of the height perhaps won more adherents than others. There was flank security in the form of a squad 100 meters ahead of each of them. The motorized-rifle subunits, making skillful use of heavy weaponry, destroyed enemy defenders on the slopes, outcroppings of defiles and dominant heights. They fired at the same time on the enemy downward from above, opening the way for the tanks. BMPs, BTRs and self-propelled artillery making up the armor group. With the capture of the dominant heights to a depth of one and a half to two kilometers (which ruled out being hit by flanking fire), it advanced along the defile by echelon right and echelon left (if width permitted it) and made directed fire on the opposing rock slopes.

The mass application of tanks was made more difficult by the conditions of the terrain. They thus attacked as platoons, and even in pairs of vehicles, along the roads and accessible sectors at intervals of 100 meters, moving by assault dashes from cover to cover. The motorized-rifle subunits attacked ahead of them, maintaining fire-support coordination among themselves.

The commanders placed their principal focus when organizing interaction on coordinating the fire of artillery, air strikes and the operations of subunits. The forward air controllers and artillery spotters, advancing in the trains of the motorized-rifle companies, facilitated the clear-cut fulfillment of the tasks.

The mortar battery of the battalion operated by platoons with the motorized-rifle companies. The Podnos 82mm mortars platoon was attached to the first echelon for the capture of the dominant heights, while the Vasilek was attached to the second-echelon company for blocking the defile.

When the enemy defenses are structured in multi-tiered fashion, their defeat was planned on all tiers simultaneously, more reliably on the first (lower) tier, as well as at strongpoints adjoining the roads, the routes of attack and at passes and commanding heights. The enemy on the first tier was suppressed by firepower designated for firing by direct laying along with artillery from indirect firing positions, on the second by artillery and mortars, and on the last by aircraft, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled air-defense mounts and various types of grenade launchers. The reliable defeat of enemy firepower in caves and various stone structures turned into multilevel fortresses was also supported by fire from small-caliber and highly effective portable rocket launchers with thermobaric ordnance.

The training of personnel for combat operations in mountains, I would note in conclusion, is an important element of subunit training. It is namely there that the experience accumulated in Afghanistan must be utilized to the full. But the time has come to determine in concrete fashion what subunits should be engaged, which specialists should be the instructors for mountain training and where they should be trained. It would be expedient to develop a program, methodological recommendations and the corresponding provisions for practical guidance in the training of troops for combat operations in the mountains.

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#### **Fortified Areas: Lessons and Conclusions**

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No 2, Feb 93 pp 27-31

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences and Docent Colonel A. Platonov, Candidate of Military Sciences Colonel A. Shevchuk and Candidate of Technical Sciences Colonel Yu. Yeremeyev: "Fortified Areas: Lessons and Conclusions—Continuation of a Theme\*"]

[Text] The authors of prior features on the problems of fortified areas [UR] were of course correct in asserting that the latter have not exhausted themselves as a form of engineer preparation of the terrain. The expediency of creating them, taking into account the unfavorable situation in which the preparation of the first defensive operations will have to take place under contemporary

conditions, evokes no doubts. One would think, with regard to the tasks of URs and their construction, that one must proceed from the contemporary state and prospects for development of military science, as well as the experience accumulated in world practice.

We would like to say something to start with. The regulations, manuals and other documents in effect today use the term "fortified area" to designate not only strongly fortified sectors of terrain, but also the special troops intended to defend them. That creates a certain confusion, in our opinion. This term would better be retained just for the concept of a section of terrain with special forms of engineer preparation, with the aim of preparing for a prolonged and stubborn defense with limited manpower against a superior enemy. The formations and units occupying a UR cannot be called other than a garrison. That is the position to which we will adhere in this article.

It was already noted in a prior feature that fortified areas have their own merits and their own weak points. The fact that their advance engineer preparation ensures high combat readiness and the effective, fortified protection of combat vehicles, armaments and personnel is a positive one. Long-term forms of engineer preparation, at the same time, simply do not keep pace with the changes that occur in both the political and the military spheres, as was demonstrated quite convincingly by Colonel V. Bakharev; that has a negative effect on the effectiveness of the future use of URs that were built early on, if the need arises. We see the resolution of this contradiction in a flexible combination of long-term and field (PUR) forms of engineer preparation of fortified areas.

The former are created only for the protection of the most important targets, i.e. those most attractive to an enemy and that he will try to seize first and foremost. Field fortified areas could be created during a period of threat, or even in the course of a war, in the sectors of the enemy's main strikes.

That division of tasks makes it possible, on the one hand, to reduce considerably the material expenditures for advance defensive construction and, on the other, to increase the efficiency of their application through the utilization of modern, constantly renewable matériel and armaments. A rise in the return on PURs will also be facilitated by their appearance at the needed spot, at the needed time and with a certain amount of surprise for the enemy.

We cannot speak of unbroken URs along state borders in the face of today's economic and political climate in the country. It is more realistic to erect them in threatened sectors and in field versions. It is important to rule out the possibility of the outflanking or rapid breakthrough of the URs by the enemy therein. And their placement only at narrow passages will scarcely be able to solve the problem.

The enemy obviously proves to be forced to storm an UR for operational-tactical considerations only if the

threat of counterattacks from it against the flanks of his own attacking groups is felt. The dimensions of the fortified area, in other words, should make it possible to use it as a jumping-off point for attack operations by one or two divisions, and the distance between neighboring URs should not exceed twice the depth of attack objective for a division. It is desirable, that is, to have an integral system of them that provides not only coverage for dangerous sectors, but also favorable conditions for cutting off an enemy who has broken through, by means of counterattacks.

A trend toward bringing them closer to the state borders, as a type of barrier, becomes obvious in an analysis of the use of fortified areas here and abroad. Experience accumulated in the past, however, shows that the attacking side in that case created with impunity the necessary groupings of manpower and equipment on its own territory and, with the start of combat operations, subjected the fortified areas to heavy fire, after which the breakthrough began. While it cannot be said that the URs played no role therein, the impact did not justify the expenditures for their creation.

This is visibly testified, for example, in the Manchurian operation of 1945, when Soviet troops successfully penetrated the Japanese URs placed directly on state borders or close to them, thanks to careful preparation.

A more recent example is the powerful fire suppression of Iraqi Army fortifications before the start of the land battles in the Persian Gulf.

There exists, on the other hand, a threat of the late occupation of a UR located on the border by its garrison in the event of a surprise start to aggression. The garrisons of URs located in the immediate proximity of the national borders, for example, were able to take up their firing positions in time in the majority of cases with the start of the incursion of German troops, but due to the undermanning of the machinegun and artillery battalions and the late deployment of field reinforcements, the fire plan at the defensive centers was not organized. At the same time, when they were able to occupy the URs and bring them to a battleworthy state at the old border, meanwhile, the enemy was stopped for a long time. The Kiev URs, for example, relying on which the troops of the 37th Army repelled the attacks of a superior enemy for more than 70 days, played an important role. The 5th Army also waged successful combat operations over the period from 16 Jun through 7 Aug 41 at the line of the Korosten URs. More such examples could be given.

The conclusion suggests itself in this regard that the URs are best placed some distance from the national borders, out of the reach of artillery fire from OPs [firing positions] on enemy territory. If, say, a security area is planned in front of the forward line of defense, it is expedient to position the URs within the confines of the main defensive belt, or even better in the second. When the width of the security area is not very deep, it should be within the second defensive belt or the army defensive line. This is better because, first of all, the battle for the main defensive belt will make it possible to

ascertain the sectors of the main enemy strikes and take the corresponding steps to reinforce the URs. Second, in that case the fortified areas can be used as jumping-off points for launching counterattacks. Third, the enemy proves to be somewhat weakened by that time, and cannot immediately begin breaking through them.

Insofar as a fortified area frequently has to repel hostile strikes from the flanks and even the rear, rather than only the front, a strip structure for its positions can hardly be deemed expedient. The average density of firepower with depth is moreover markedly reduced with a linear structure. One cannot count on increasing resistance to the enemy as he advances.

That is why a self-contained structure of defensive lines with a circular or semi-circular outline and radial, cut-off positions (Fig. 1), would in all likelihood be more expedient. The latter is moreover justified only under conditions where rear areas are reliably covered with natural barrier lines or some defensive structures.

The quantity of circular positions is conditional upon the dimensions of the UR and its volume. It is desirable that the distance between them be such that an enemy cannot attack them in sequence without altering the OPs of his supporting fire.

The depth of each of the circular positions should provide for antitank fire located at their rear borders, and the execution of directed fire against an enemy in battle from the forward zone.

The cut-off radial positions, which are prepared for the whole depth of the fortified area, form defensive sectors of a sort. The maximum distance between these positions is best such that the artillery from OPs located in adjoining sectors can fire on an enemy that has penetrated, covering the attacked sector across its entire width.

The overall number of sectors will depend on the length of the front and the tasks of the UR. When manpower is insufficient, the rear and flank sectors can be occupied by mobile units of the garrison in the event of an enemy attack there. Such a structuring of the positions makes it possible to augment the resistance to the enemy to the extent of his advance in depth, since the defensive front will be narrowed while the attackers will begin to be drawn into fire pockets and come under fire from adjoining sectors.

Strongpoints located in a minimum of two lines and in staggered order constitute the foundation of the positions. The intervals between them are prepared with decoy and back-up strongpoints, and minefields are emplaced there.

It is desirable that the size of each strongpoint be such that the firepower located at the center of it can fire effectively against hostile infantry attacking or outflanking it. The defensive front, in other words, should

Fig. 1. Structure of defensive positions in a UR




Рис.1 Построение оборонительных позиций в УР:  
1 - кольцевые позиции; 2 - радиальные позиции;  
3 - оборонительный сектор УР.

**Key:**

1. circular positions
2. radial positions
3. defensive sector of the UR

not exceed twice the length of the effective range of fire of the principal anti-personnel weaponry.

It is also very important that the distance between the strongpoints support fire coordination among themselves, and that antitank weapons can take part in battle beyond the forward edge of the position from their second line.

The foundation of the fortified preparation of strongpoints in a long-term fortified area are long-term structures (DFS) with casemate-type artillery, antitank, flamethrower, machinegun and grenade-launching weaponry. They are best placed across the whole area of the site, conforming to the fire plan adopted. It also makes sense, in the interests of increasing the ability of the defense to resist, to link all the structures among each other with covered communications routes with access to the surface to back-up emplacements for weaponry or self-contained fighting positions in an additional sector (Fig. 2).

Field structures of both a covered (commercially manufactured, by and large) and open type (Fig. 3) are entirely justified in the fortification preparation of a PUR. The necessity of preparing dugout shelters at strongpoints is disappearing with the erection of the former for all firearms and portable antitank weaponry, as well as the

KNPs [tactical command posts] for subunit commanders. The survivability of the subunit will moreover be higher than if it were in dugout shelters, thanks to the dispersion of the personnel across the position during periods of enemy fire.

Emplacements with a protective/camouflaging screen and emplacements for firing contiguous with them are best created for combat vehicles (tanks, BMPs [infantry fighting vehicles], BM PTURs [antitank missile combat vehicles], SAUs [self-propelled artillery] and the like). Earthen walls, providing for both the protected maneuvering of the combat vehicle and its effective application, may be widely employed therein (Fig. 4).

A system of trenches with communications trenches is best prepared only within the confines of the strongpoints. The attacker could otherwise make partial use of them under favorable conditions to conceal himself from our fire in the process of attack.

As for the sequence for preparing a fortified area and the erection of structures, the frontal and flank circular positions are created first, as well as the principal positions and areas. Behind them go the cut-off and back-up positions, and in conclusion the circular and radial positions in the rear sectors, since the troops may not occupy them and they are only prepared in the event of the threat of a strike from the rear. Structures are erected

Fig. 2. Fortification preparation of a strongpoint for a machinegun and artillery company at a long-term UR (variation)




Рис.2. Фортификационное оборудование опорного пункта пулеметной и артиллерийской роты в долговременном УР (вариант).

Fig. 3. Fortification preparation of a strongpoint for a machinegun and artillery company with a tank platoon at a PUR (variation)





Рис. 3. Фортификационное оборудование опорного пункта пулеметной и артиллерийской роты с танковым взводом в ПУР (вариант).

**Fig. 4. Tank position****Рис. 4. Позиция танка.**

at all positions in the first phase that provide for the effective use of weaponry and military hardware, as well as protection of the personnel against conventional and high-precision weaponry. The second phase is providing for concealed maneuver by weaponry, and the protection of the personnel against weapons of mass destruction.

Tentative calculations now show that the amount of all the measures herein is quite considerable compared to conventional engineer preparation of sectors and defensive belts. One thus perhaps will not be able to manage without the introduction of a sufficient quantity of engineer subunits into the standard composition of the PUR garrison. The method of operating with engineer support, in our opinion, is not an effective one.

A loss of time for organizing the performance of engineer tasks is inevitable, owing to the necessity of coordinating issues of interaction, even if the necessary reinforcements are allocated immediately in accordance with the plans for the first defensive operation; the PUR will not be fully prepared over the required day and a half or two days.

A variation when engineer subunits of army or front subordination perform the engineer preparation of a PUR ahead of time independently for formations and field reinforcement units (as they used to) also proves not to be very effective. The principal danger here is that the positions they have created may not coincide with the subsequent decisions of commanders for the arrangement of the battle formations and the organization of the fire plan. The commanders, that is, end up facing the choice of either "subscribing" to someone else's decision or breaking it, as indeed most often happened in the Great Patriotic War, when rear defensive lines prepared by combat-engineer armies were no more than 50 percent utilized by the troops.

The most expedient variation, therefore, is clearly the one under which a special unit (or formation) of the required standard organizational structure and with the

necessary manpower and equipment, including engineer armaments, for the preparation of field-type structures is brought in for the defense of a fortified area.

Such formations, we would note in closing, should also have a special program of combat training that provides for the successful operations of units and subunits and for the fulfillment of the tasks of engineer preparation of a PUR and its defense.

#### **Footnote**

\*—VOYENNYY VESTNIK.—1991 No. 4; 1992 Nos. 7, 10, 11.

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#### **Causes of Declining Readiness Among Airborne Troops**

93UM06004 Moscow ARMIYA in Russian  
No 3, 93 (Signed to press 16 Feb 93) pp 52-55

[Article by VDV [Airborne Troops] Staff Operations Directorate Division Training Group Chief Lieutenant-Colonel P. Ashikhmin: "The Splendor and Tribulations of the Airborne Infantry"]

[Text] Recently at an airborne unit that has been withdrawn from a nearby foreign country to Russia, I managed to hear quite a few rebukes from the officers. They said, they've encountered nothing but problems and difficulties in the Homeland. There aren't enough barracks for personnel, shelters for vehicles, apartments for officers and warrant officers, and training facilities are almost totally absent. These and numerous other problems are having an extremely negative impact on combat training. Of course, such comments lead to sad thoughts. But the officers are largely correct.

I remember a recent planned exercise for a VDV [Airborne Troops] division. Little distinguished it from previous exercises. And the missions were ordinary, the airborne troops carried them out—they rehearsed operations of units to delay an advancing "enemy" during the period while our primary forces deployed and approached the border. But the grossest errors were permitted by certain officials. So, for example, at one airborne regiment Lieutenant-Colonel A. Kudimov with all of his experience and knowledge did not know how to correctly organize cooperation among subunits and with neighbors. As a result, when a unit that had been operating in a support zone withdrew through the combat formations of this regiment, confusion arose. In a real combat situation, this could have resulted in sad consequences and large personnel losses and as a result the enemy could have broken through the forward edge of our defense while on the move right behind the troops that were withdrawing.

The artillerymen acted in far from the best fashion. The self-propelled guns of the artillery regiment and the airborne regiments' battalions and the antitank systems

occupied fire positions and firing lines. After that, as the guns roared and the wind carried away puffs of dust from the explosions, it was determined that many targets had escaped damage. The artillery division had not fulfilled its mission: the "enemy" had not been damaged and, knowing our fire positions, could itself have inflicted a crushing blow. Organizational conclusions were subsequently made based upon the results of the exercise. Division Artillery Chief Colonel V. Afonin and Artillery Regiment Commander Lt-Col A. Gubanov were relieved of the positions they held for serious omissions in the organization of the training process.

I would not like for the readers to make the hasty conclusions that today's VDV is not at all like yesterday's. The end-of-training period performance evaluation showed that nine of the 13 divisions and 12 of the 17 regiments where the boards worked received good evaluations. On the whole, the VDV received a high evaluation by the Russian Ministry of Defense leadership. But the example cited forces us to ponder the fact that the causes of the weak combat skill of certain airborne units and especially those that have been withdrawn from nearby foreign countries and those that are still there are behind the lack of professionalism of individual commanders or superiors. Everything is much more complicated.

First of all the unstable situation in the former Union is having far from the best impact on the quality of combat training of airborne troops and that is commander's training and training of compulsory service personnel. Being in nearby foreign countries, they are restricted literally in everything. They are restricted in movement, the opportunity to conduct exercises in the field and all the more so tactical exercises and live firing. The local authorities prohibit all of these measures. There often is no fuel and the transport aviation fleet is being substantially reduced. Therefore, many conventions and simplification are being permitted in training. Those same artillerymen, who received an "unsatisfactory" for firing at the exercises, could not have fired any better even if they had wanted to. They haven't fired for a prolonged period of time and they rehearsed all of the exercises only in classes, theoretically. And that, you will agree, does not ensure good professional skills.

And later, it is impossible not to consider this factor. Right now the army is frequently involved not with what it is designed to do but with those things that are not part of its functions. First of all, this concerns the so-called special missions for which VDV units have been called in beginning since 1988. But then again, airborne troops in "hot spots" are not now simply "peacekeepers", they frequently rescue peaceful residents from bandits and robbers. During the last year, 22 airborne troops have died and 64 have been wounded. They withdrew the besieged Russian motorized rifle regiment from Karabakh literally on their shoulders. In Abkhazia, they separated the belligerent Georgians and Abkhazians, prevented a bloody massacre, and defended personnel and people who were resting at Black Sea health camps.

Tell me, under such conditions can you be involved in planned combat training—to learn how to fire, drive combat vehicles, or become tempered both physically and morally?

In the division which I talked about at the very beginning, the regiments were practically not involved in combat training because they were in Tskhinval, the Dniester Republic and Vladikavkaz for more than six months. If we want the airborne troops to meet their assignment and to be the foundation of Russia's mobile forces in the future, we need to create conditions for them that permit them to be involved in normal combat training.

A well-equipped training process means a lot for a division's or regiment's combat readiness. You will agree that you can have the most modern weapons and combat vehicles, and master advanced tactics but if the personnel are poorly trained, you will not win the battle. I will not talk about the training of officers—so everything is clear. There are neither troops nor victories without a skilled commander.

Right now local commanders are most concerned about the training of junior specialists. The fact is that the leadership of sovereign Lithuania has refused to accept conscripts from Russia on its territory. And the only center for training junior specialists in the VDV is on Lithuanian soil. Sergeants entered all of our troops from there for many years. Right now that is not happening. Therefore, the decision was made to train sergeants at the facilities of combat divisions that are deployed in Russia. And at the same time to create a new training center. But what kind of center will it be?

Some commanders persistently defend the idea of a return to regimental schools at which new recruits were previously trained. They advance the fact that major training centers provide a large percentage of flaws as the primary argument in their favor. Their graduates can perform their duties normally only after a six-month stay in the troops. There are a limited number of soldiers at a regimental school and you can organize the training process well and closely monitor the progress of each sergeant's training. Yes, that is so. But, on the other hand, is it realistic to train soldiers of the approximately 56 specialties that are required for a modern airborne regiment there? VDV Headquarters has conducted research on that score. It turned out that you can totally train soldiers of only 5-6 specialties at a regimental center. There simply is not enough personnel or capabilities to train more. So, we think that the future is large, well-equipped specialist training centers.

But here's the question: where will we get the money to organize them? I think we need to approach with this yardstick. We also need to structure training professionally in the professional army toward which we aspire. We should not economize on the training of specialists. Nothing good will come of it. In the matter of training

defenders of the Fatherland, we must be guided by the country's highest interests—its security.

I must touch upon the issue of our weaponry. We need to admit that military science has done a lot so that we have everything necessary for the defense of our Fatherland. But right now we have simply been deprived of many things due to the largely unrestricted nature of pricing policy. Take, by way of illustration, the combat assault vehicle that is the foundation of VDV weaponry. Right now the latest BMD-3 has been developed and has begun to enter the inventory. It substantially exceeds the previous model in maneuverability, armor protection, weaponry, and comfort of the crew and assault troops. However, due to the lack of money, last year we could only order a few of these vehicles. And the plant that manufactures the armored hull is not setting up for a small quantity, it is refusing to cooperate because its production capacity stands idle and its skilled workers are leaving. If the Ministry of Defense does not issue an order for a large shipment of BMD-3's in the near future, the enterprise will be compelled to shift to the production of other vehicles. Then where will we get combat vehicles?

The shortage of money is being reflected in practice in the deliveries of all equipment and weaponry. So, they have not allocated to us the sums required and the troops received a total of three hundred parachutes instead of several thousand. The most modern mobile assault surface-to-air missile complex that is needed for defense from the airborne enemy and for which there are no similar vehicles in the armies of the world has been transformed into a long-term development. Analysis of the Desert Storm operation has shown that it is impossible to count on success in modern war without good cover from missile-aircraft strikes. If you consider that our troops are at heightened risk, you can understand how great the significance of everything new and leading is to us which promotes increasing the safety of personnel.

What kind of solution do I see here? The same one that I talked about. We cannot economize on the security of the state. We need to think well about what kind of army we need, what number of airborne troops we need, and provide the required resources to equip them well.

And of course we must see the very urgent social everyday life problems that give rise to uncertainty in tomorrow and a negative attitude toward service among many of our officers. More than 300 junior officers were released from the VDV last year alone. As a rule, platoon, crew and battery commanders are leaving. It is they who must be directly involved in the training and education of personnel. Right now we have a shortage of 1,405 airborne officers in our troops. And the outflow of specialists continues. And in previous years literally thousands of letters and requests for transfer to the VDV from other services and combat arms came to our headquarters. Now that is not occurring. Everything has a limit. Airborne troops walk on the razor's edge in "hot spots". In Russia, an unsettled way of life and savings of

every kopek in the family await them. Here it would be noteworthy to talk about the airborne brigade that Colonel A. Sotnik commands.

The unit was rapidly withdrawn from Central Asia to the Northern Caucasus. A well-appointed garrison, the entire training facility, and housing was left behind at the former location. One of all of the sagging, prefabricated-panel barracks, designed for 120 men, was allocated at the new location. Practically the entire unit was billeted in tents. The hospitable Cossacks made the servicemen's families feel at home. But who will now say how long the 130 families of airborne troops will have to scrape by in other people's homes? The people live and serve in total uncertainty. This has an oppressive impact on the officers. And, to our great misfortune, very many cannot endure the "temporary-permanent" ordeals and are submitting requests for release. Right now there are practically no authorized platoon commanders left in this brigade. If the social everyday life sphere and the monetary salary do not radically improve in the near future, this brigade, yes and then again many other units, will be deprived of an even larger number of highly-skilled specialists who love their profession. I will cite these figures in confirmation: 581 officers were released from the VDV in 1991. Already 900, 700 of them men in the rank below captain, have been released in 1992. There is something to ponder here.

Right now everyday life difficulties have resulted in one other very painful problem for the troops. Our officers have been compelled to voluntarily often change duty locations to move to other garrisons due to the low number of officers in the VDV. Very many of them, who have managed to find apartments, once again find themselves at the end of the line for housing. And right now quite a few officers categorically oppose transfers to other garrisons until they obtain apartments at their previous duty location. They do not even want to move to the capital to higher positions or for studies at the academy. For example, one promising senior officer was offered an opportunity to transfer to serve at VDV Headquarters. He refused and said that it will be better to obtain an apartment in an oblast city and to give his family some sort of social guarantees in this troubled time than to end up homeless in Moscow, although in a prestigious position. For him, it was simply shameful to torment his family in official communal quarters or to live with people they don't know, while paying thousands of rubles from a comparatively small salary for a roof for the family.

Right now many officers think that the time has come to introduce official apartments at garrisons for servicemen. If you transfer—vacate the housing and you will immediately obtain other housing at the new duty location. And during service, build an apartment or a house in any rayon of Russia. That will be most correct approach to the solution of the very urgent housing problem.

### Tyulpan 240-mm Self-Propelled Heavy Mortar Described

93UM0571B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 May 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Vitaliy Morozov, under the rubric: "Arsenal": "There Are no Mortars More Powerful Than 'Tyulpan'"]

[Text] The mortar is a Russian invention. Therefore, it seems entirely logical that for us there are a series of indisputable priorities in this sphere of weaponry. Confirmation of that is the 2S4 "Tyulpan" 240-mm self-propelled mortar.

"Tyulpan" [Tulip] is a contemporary and close relative of the 2S3 "Akatsiya" [Acacia] 152-mm self-propelled howitzer and the 2S5 "Giatsint" [Hyacinth] 152-mm self-propelled gun. It—you can judge this by the model number—is their middle brother. All of these self-propelled artillery systems were developed in the first half of the 1970's at Uraltransmash under the leadership of Yuriy Vasilyevich Tomashov. Indeed, Perm machine builders developed "Tyulpan's" weapon itself—the 2B8 mortar. Yuriy Nikolayevich Kalachnikov designed it.

"Tyulpan" shares with "Akatsiya" and "Giatsint" not only the time and place of birth but also a single drive train that is, as we see, all-purpose in nature. From the plant shops, the self-propelled mortar was sent, as a rule, to heavy artillery brigades.

Like the majority of its smoothbore counterparts, "Tyulpan" is a muzzle-loading mortar. The question arises: but how do you lift a mortar round weighing more than a hundredweight (100 kg), or then again two hundred-weight, to the impressive height of the barrel? Mechanization has come to the crew's rescue. Inside the system, the mortar rounds are located in two drums (up to 20 in each). By a turn of the drum, they are fed into the hatches in the vehicle's roof. And then they are lifted to the muzzle face and sent into the barrel in the holders of a special telescoping mechanism. A round is fired either mechanically or electrically.

There are two types of mortar rounds in the 2S4's combat load: conventional high-explosive fragmentation and base-bleed. The latter are equipped with rocket engines that are set off after firing to increase flight range.

"Tyulpan" has an electro-hydraulic elevation drive. You can control the mortar using a remote control panel. In the travel position, the barrel is installed parallel to the roof and the self-propelled mortar acquires dimensions that are suitable for transport and the capability to complete a rapid march and to easily maneuver on rough terrain.

The 2S4 240-mm self-propelled mortar is a powerful fire system. It is effective and it is also indispensable when it is necessary to destroy the enemy on the reverse slopes of hills or to destroy his long-term defensive fortifications.

Based upon its high-explosive fragmentation effect, the mortar round significantly exceeds even a howitzer or gun projectile that is equal to it in caliber. And there is no equal to it in caliber in foreign artillery.

### Tactical-Technical Specifications of the 2S4 "Tyulpan" 240-mm Self-Propelled Mortar

Maximum firing range, in meters	
—Of a high-explosive fragmentation mortar round	9,650
—Of a base-bleed mortar round	18,000
Rate of fire, rounds per second	
—With a medium position of the barrel (60°)	62
—With an extreme position of the barrel (80°)	77
Angle of elevation, in degrees	
—Along the vertical	+ 50 + 80
—Along the horizontal	+/- 10
Combat load	
—Mines	40
—Cartridges for the PKT machinegun	1,500
Speed, in kph	up to 60
Range based upon fuel, km	500
Weight, in kilograms	
—of the mortar	27,500 +/- 2%
—of a high-explosive fragmentation mortar round	130
—of a base-bleed mortar round	225

### Winter Training Results Viewed for Troops in Transcaucasus

93UM0633A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
26 Jun 93 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Leonid Pozdnyakov: "They Have Not Forgotten How to Fire and Operate the Vehicles"]

[Text] Tbilisi—The results of the combat training for the winter training period have been summed up for the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus.

Despite the instability of the political situation in the Transcaucasus countries, the fact that the official status of the Russian troops in Georgia has not been decided and the unceasing attacks upon military personnel and installations to capture weapons, ammunition and military property, the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus is still a powerful, battleworthy and controlled fighting entity. This was confirmed by a commanders' assembly for leading personnel of formations and units conducted in the 147th Motorized Rifle Division in the city of Akhalkalaki by Lt Gen Fedor Reut, commander of the GRVZ [Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus].

During the exercises the officers demonstrated a high level of professional skill, administrative and technical military expertise and organizational skills. An

expanded session of the group's military council was held at the end of the assembly, at which the results of the combat training were summed up for the first training period. It was noted that the training period was concluded basically with good results.

Objective difficulties, the manning shortage in the units and the removal of officers from the training to perform guard and internal service duties had their effect, of course. The units and subunits commanded by A. Glushenko, Lt Col I. Bronitskiy and Lt Col B. Volkov received unsatisfactory evaluations for the training period.

The combat training missions were performed most completely and well in the motorized rifle division commanded by Maj Gen B. Babkin and the motorized rifle regiments commanded by Col B. Povodyrev, Col S. Kim and Col V. Kuzmin, and Lt Col A. Danilov.

## CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### Tochka, Luna Surface-To-Air Missile Complex Characteristics Compared

*93UM06074 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jun 93 p 2*

[Article by Col. Vitaliy Moroz: "Tochka' Overshadows 'Luna'"]

[Text] Many who served in the army are well acquainted with the "Luna-M" tactical missile complex, with the launcher based on the ZIL-135 all-terrain vehicle. In the mid-70s it began to be replaced by the "Tochka" complex, and from the end of the 80s the troops were equipped with the modification "Tochka-U," which had a longer range of fire.

I believe it incorrect to compare the "Luna" with the "Tochka," to prove the advantages of the latter. The "Tochka" is a representative of a new generation of tactical missile weapons. In contrast to the "Luna," it belongs among the precision weapons. Suffice to say that when the "Luna-M" missile was fired at a maximal range of 65 km, maximal deviations of up to 2.8 km in range and 1.8 km in direction were permitted. Only the powerful warhead made it possible to be reconciled to such dispersion. When the missile of the "Tochka-U" complex is fired, deviations are measured in meters. At a weapons exhibition in Abu-Dabi (United Arab Emirates), after six demonstration launches of the "Tochka-U" tactical missile complex, the average deviation of the missiles from the target center was around 15 meters. As you know, enemy missile launchers and concentrations of unarmored or lightly armored equipment, airfields, command posts and so forth are considered the main target of tactical missiles. A simultaneous strike in the tactical depth with several missiles is possible. Outwardly the launcher of the "Tochka-U" complex does not appear very threatening. When the missile is hidden, one might not even guess the purpose of the vehicle, which is reminiscent of a boat on wheels. The Bryansk

automobile builders created a very original chassis, which is used not only in the missile troops. Both the "Tochka" launcher and the transporter-loader (with two missiles) on the same chassis feel excellent both on the march and in the water. Of course, in the whole world only our tactical missile complex is amphibious. Many specialists deem this quality to be unnecessary and superfluous for missile equipment.

In contrast to the "Luna-M," the launcher of the "Tochka" complex is completely autonomous. It can proceed alone to an unprepared launch area and after a few minutes fire a missile at the target designated by the commander. Everything necessary for this is in the launcher: the fueling and aiming systems and the monitors and meters. The crew (of 4) just enters the coordinates of the target in the electronic computer. The rest is up to the automatic equipment. During preparatory work, the missile does not tower over the launcher. It is raised along with the guide rail right before launch, mere seconds. And after fire, the missile troops immediately leave the area.

The missile of the "Tochka-U" complex (9M71-1F) is a single-stage missile with a solid-fuel motor. Its flight is controlled over the entire trajectory, from the moment of launch until destruction of the target. The missile comes with two types of warheads: the dispenser type (with 50 fragmentation bomblets) or a high-explosive fragmentation warhead. They are identical in shape and mass.

In the seventies, when the "Tochka" complex was born, there was nothing like it abroad. Our designers were ahead of their time, as they say. Now the Americans have a tactical missile complex which is similar in its capabilities. But still, no one wanted to compete with the "Tochka-U" at the range near Abu-Dabi.

### Basic Characteristics of the "Tochka-U" Tactical Missile Complex

Range of fire, km	
Maximal	120
Minimal	20
Dimensions of missile, mm	
Length	6,416
Maximal diameter	650
Span of aerodynamic control surfaces	1,448
Launch mass of missile, kg	2,010
Mass of warhead, kg	482

## CIS: NAVAL FORCES

### First Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin on Navy Shipbuilding Problems

*93UM0534A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Apr 93 p 4*

[Article by Yuriy Mamchur, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, under rubric "Defense Complex": "It Is Not Enough for

**the Navy Simply To Survive: All the Best Must Be Preserved and Shipbuilding Prospects Defined"]**

[Text] In Russia's history, beginning with Peter the Great, the Navy always acted not only as an effective element of military might, but also as a reliable tool of policy and diplomacy, a high social and moral force, thanks to which we are a great naval power. For almost three centuries the St. Andrew's ensign and then the USSR naval ensign fluttered proudly over ocean expanses. The need for a powerful Russian Navy is dictated by life itself, by the state's geography and economy. We are devoting this issue of "Defense Complex" to the Navy: of all branches of the Armed Forces, it finds itself in almost the most difficult situation...

There are many reasons for this. Skews in military organizational development of recent decades led to a striking imbalance between weapons proper and the infrastructure, and in the Navy's case between creation of ships proper and systems for their basing, support and above all repair, where approximately 60 percent of Navy needs were met even in the best years. In the absence of equipped piers many ships were forced to lie out on returning from deployment, depleting the life of main power plants for life support of crews. As a result, they now are leaving the order of battle considerably earlier than prescribed by all world standards.

The Soviet Navy had several times more classes of primary combatant ships in the inventory than the U.S. Navy, making its operation more costly and complicating combat teamwork training. There were many instances where ships were accepted into the order of battle with maladjusted machinery and systems, as a result of which they were noncombat-ready for several years more and were completed by industry and the Navy.

Disintegration of the USSR, the economic crisis, a sharp reduction in expenditures for equipment and arms procurement and for ship repair, and an inadequate policy exacerbated chronic problems even more and engendered new ones. Thus, if present rates of naval construction curtailment are preserved over the next few years, a critical period will set in already in the first decade of the 21st century, when service lives of ships built in the 1980's begin to expire. Russia's might as a naval power will end up at the level of third world countries. This is why today it is necessary not simply to survive, but to preserve all the best that has accumulated in the Navy and the shipbuilding industry and take a look at the distant outlook. Development of the Navy and its specific nature demand especially profound orientation toward the future and consideration of long-range interests of the country's security and its real capabilities.

These questions acutely face the Ministry of Defense and other departments, and they worry everyone who is not indifferent to the Navy's fate. They also were raised at the "What Kind of Navy Does Russia Need?" Science Conference held in St. Petersburg, organized by the

Central Naval Library and the "Public in the Navy's Defense" Committee. Conferees—admirals, officers, scientists, designers, industrialists and Navy veterans—spoke sharply and with concern about problems of the Russian Navy.

Bitter words also were uttered. Some veterans expressed fears that the combined-arms commanders who dominate the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense will not be able to properly assess the Navy's role and purpose. They agreed on one thing: Russia needs a strong Navy with an optimum structure and makeup meeting Russia's national interests.

First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrey Kokoshin took part in conference work. In particular, he said that in accordance with basic provisions of Russian military doctrine, one primary Navy mission is to provide a reliable nuclear deterrence. It also plays a leading role in repelling potential aggression in naval theaters and assisting in the success of other branches in a number of continental theaters of military operations. In addition, the Navy probably is the most flexible tool of state foreign policy and diplomacy. Showing the Russian Navy at the right time and in the right place is an important function in ensuring Russia's security interests and our economic interests. Priorities in development of naval forces and equipment stem from this.

One such priority is to upgrade the entire complex of reconnaissance, communications, and battle management equipment and raise its level of integration. In addition, as a number of conferees rightly noted, proper attention also should be given to shore-based missile systems and shore-based attack aviation.

Modernizing ships and other naval equipment which have given a good account of themselves in operation is becoming a principal direction based on economic realities. The Ministry of Defense will do everything possible to see that they are outfitted with the most modern weapons and newest navigation equipment.

These priorities for development of naval forces and equipment also must be sustained accordingly in military-industrial policy. The period of uncertainty for the defense industry is coming to an end: the Ministry of Defense gave all head enterprises an orientation based on the defense order up to 1995. At the cost of enormous efforts the government and Russian Federation Supreme Soviet were successfully persuaded as to the need to increase expenditures for arms and military equipment procurement in 1993 compared with 1992 (in constant prices). The long-range armament program, fundamentals of which were approved by the Minister of Defense back on 25 December 1992, is the base for joint work of industry, science and the Armed Forces.

The Ministry of Defense plans to concentrate the military order in a lesser number of enterprises than before

and in the most necessary directions based on an in-depth analysis of the status of industry. This is a painful process demanding difficult, comprehensively weighed decisions.

"We are doing everything possible to preserve the strongest collectives and high-tech productions," emphasized the first deputy minister of defense. "For example, we are providing Sevmashpredpriyatiye [Severodvinsk Machine-Building Enterprise], the center of nuclear powered submarine shipbuilding, and a number of leading scientific research institutes [SRI's] and design bureaus with financing that is significant for present times."

This is the overall Russian Ministry of Defense strategy with respect to the defense complex, but optimizing the military order has its limits. Therefore in Kokoshin's opinion it is necessary to achieve a certain increase in defense appropriations, especially for RDT&E and for creating an S&T reserve. It is necessary to fit out ships which are on the shipbuilding ways. As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA already reported, fitting out the heavy guided missile cruiser Petr Velikiy at the Baltic Yard is among the top priority missions of the Ministry of Defense here.

Minister of Defense General of the Army Pavel Grachev is giving more and more attention to naval problems, as attested in particular by his trips to the Northern and Baltic fleets and visits to shipbuilding enterprises. Naval problems are regularly examined in the Ministry of Defense Collegium, so that, in the words of the first deputy minister of defense, the fears of some naval veterans that the Ministry of Defense leadership is not taking full account of the Navy's importance are groundless.

Before the Revolution, on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, and in later times mistakes in naval organizational development were made more than once on what can be said without exaggeration to be a strategic scale. Meanwhile, the life cycle of a series of ships of the same class from concept formulation to decommissioning is at least 25-30 years. Therefore the main provisions of military-technical policy and concepts for creation of the Navy must remain unchanged for a considerable period and be protected to the maximum extent from vacillations of current policy and foreign and domestic market conditions.

Are there possibilities for this? It would appear so. To Russia's honor, at the most dramatic moments of history there always were forces in her midst which advanced new ideas and thoughts and mobilized public opinion in support of the Navy. Even now we have not been done out of bright heads— theoreticians and practitioners of naval affairs and industrialists dedicated to naval interests, who even under conditions of a catastrophically fallen defense order managed to preserve special industries, mobilization capacities, and to a considerable extent also labor collectives. If only the state and society would give them support, support adequate not only to its present

geopolitical and economic position, but at least partly to the country's genuine needs for a powerful, modern Navy.

### Naval Component of Rapid Reaction Forces

93UM0541A Moscow VOYENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 2, Feb 93 pp 24-26

[Article by Captain 1st Rank A. Bobrakov<sup>1</sup>: "Rapid Reaction Forces: The Naval Component"]

[Text] Many of the problems raised by the author have been disputed for a long time. Does it make sense to create rapid reaction forces based on the MP [marine infantry] if their sphere of application is small? Are the expenditures for re-arming them justified by a coincident rise in combat effectiveness? The answers to these and other questions touched on in the article would seem to be found in the course of debate among professionals. We invite specialists of the airborne assault forces, combined arms commanders, staff officers and instructors at higher educational institutions to join the discussion.

The airborne assault troops are considered to be the basis for rapid reaction forces in most features today. In my opinion, taking into account the extent of the maritime borders of Russia, marine assault forces should be an indispensable component of them. The organization and fundamentals for the combat application of these latter merit detailed consideration.

The determination of the optimal composition of the troops taken on assault vessels and transport and the organization of fire against the anti-assault defenses of the enemy were the most difficult tasks for me as chief of staff of the landing forces when planning a naval assault operation at a recent exercise. Most army commanders without fail wanted to "travel by sea" and enter into battle only with standard subunits with all of their matériel, the pilots wanted to bomb only area targets etc. The command of the assault and landing forces could not do this, naturally, since every square meter of useful space of the assault vessels and every tonne of their displacement was intended for the redeployment of only the most effective firepower, with the maximum possible ammunition supply, to the area of combat operations.

In practice up to half of the manpower and equipment of the ground formations remained on shore as somehow burdensome in battle. The Grad multiple-launch rocket system (RSZO), for instance, does not have any amphibious capability and carries just one ammunition load with it. And what problems there were with logistical supply! A host of types of ordnance, fuels, lubricants... If a transport had been sunk or an echelon with just one type of supplies been bombed, the troops would rise up. And in war, as is well known, they are burned and they do sink. We thus had to create non-standard formations, units and subunits right down to the platoon level for the duration of the operation, in order to land troop units able to wage combat operations autonomously.

The Americans solved this problem in cardinal fashion at one time, with formations of the same types of vessels at the bases, *i.e.* the administrative organization, and formations of various types of forces (the operational organization) at sea. Expeditionary battalions, brigades and divisions of the U.S. Marines are always ready for autonomous combat operations.

The complement of landing and assault troops we have here does not entirely meet the tasks that are performed by rapid reaction forces. The necessity of making the one and the other more up-to-date has become acute. But the construction and assimilation of new vessels is a long and expensive process, and it would be faster and simpler to reform the assault forces.

Both the marine infantry and the motorized-rifle divisions allotted for assault are currently in essence little distinguished from conventional formations of the ground forces. A certain portion of the vehicles of the marine infantry, and most of those of the motorized-rifle units, are not even "hypothetically amphibious" (having a small reserve of amphibious capability). The rear support is entirely non-amphibious. The lack of their own helicopters among the marine infantry and their limited numbers among the motorized-rifle divisions, which are moreover equipped with cumbersome equipment, make the assault troops not very mobile and able to fight only on a two-dimensional horizontal plane, without vertical envelopments. The saturation with heavy equipment does not permit the use of the cargo capacity of assault vessels, especially that of air-cushion (VP) vessels, with the maximum effectiveness. A Dzheyran class VP small assault craft, for instance, can land either a battalion of soldiers with their personal weapons (400 men) or one (!) T-55AM medium tank.

The combat capabilities of solitary professional soldiers armed with PTURs [antitank guided missiles], PZRKs [air-defense missile systems], automatic grenade launchers, flamethrowers etc. is almost comparable to the combat capabilities of heavy vehicles (tanks, BMPs [infantry fighting vehicles], SAUs [self-propelled artillery pieces]). High-precision weaponry has made it possible to move from strikes against areas to the destruction of individual targets.

The situation is reminiscent of the situation during the Crimean War, when the firing range of rifled longarms (carbines) was comparable to that of smoothbore cannons, *i.e.* infantrymen were able to engage artillerymen in real solitary combat. The enemy unfortunately had the carbines. A defeated Russia had to pursue military reforms.

It is undoubtedly better, however, to pursue them ahead of time, so as to avoid defeat. The time has come, one would think, to engage in the re-organization of the marine infantry brigades with a regard for the specific features of the theaters of combat operations. They should, according to calculations, most expeditiously be 5,000 men in size. The chief idea is landing a large

quantity of very well-armed soldiers, able to seize a small port city and the adjoining shoreline and destroy cruise missile launchers, radars, SAM systems and communications centers—rather than landing vehicles—in the advance detachment of a marine assault. Individual platoons of marine infantry (MP), operating on a broad front, should neutralize the principal centers of anti-assault defense (PDO) and destroy the command and control of enemy troops, thereby supporting the attack of the first echelon of the assault.

What could be the composition of a marine infantry assault? We will consider a variation for surmounting PDO where the chief enemy forces are 30—50 km [kilometers] away from the shore. In that case the second echelon (reserves) from the non-attacked zones are able to reach the landing area in two hours, and strike forces from a staging area in just three or four hours. It consequently makes sense to land troops able at least to repel a strike by a motorized-infantry brigade in the first two or three hours, going over to the defense in the process of offensive battle, and under favorable conditions even routing it.

A beachhead of no less than 17 km across and 8—12 km in depth is necessary to land the main forces of an assault from water-displacing ships and transports. The overall length of the line of combat contact is 38—40 km. The landing of just seven or eight battalions will be required to hold the beachhead with a standard frontal width of battalion defense of five kilometers. Eleven or twelve battalions with the corresponding support weapons will be needed, allowing for possible losses in an offensive (up to 30 percent). There should thus be a minimum of 4,800 men and 757 pieces of equipment (tanks, self-propelled artillery and flamethrowers, PTUR BMs [combat vehicles], PTP [antitank guns] and air-defense assets) in the advance detachment of an assault.

A naval assault in the classic variation, as is well known, is landed as follows: the advance detachment—a reinforced brigade of marine infantry (without rear-support subunits)—on fast-moving vessels; the first echelon—the main combat subunits of the division of ground forces—on medium water-displacing ships and assault ships, as well as roll-on roll-off type transports; and, the second echelon—heavy armaments and rear support for the marine infantry brigade and the divisions—on various types of transports and ferries. The landing of the first echelon concludes by the time of H+6 hours, and the moored unloading of transports with the second echelon and rear support begins at H+(6—8) hours.

A few words regarding the selection of the assault-landing assets. The assault forces suffer the greatest losses with entry into the enemy two-kilometer coastal zone, chiefly from shipborne, patrol-craft and shore-launched cruise missile systems, as well as integrated reconnaissance-and-strike systems. The supremacy of the means of attack over the means of defense will be preserved to the year 2000, taking into account the modern state of anti-missile defenses for ships and development trends in missile weaponry. Any ship,

however well organized the protection, can be destroyed with the appropriate salvo composition. It will thus hardly be possible to preserve entirely the major assault ships taking part in an operation in a crossing and during the landing, even with the destruction of up to 75 percent of the missile platforms. The loss of just one ship quite markedly reduces the combat capabilities of the assault.

The future thus belongs to small, fast assault ships. The greater the speed, the less time spent in the enemy fire zone, and the lower the likelihood of their destruction. The appearance of a large number of targets within the limits of missile range not only reduces the likelihood of the destruction of each of them separately in proportion to their numbers; there is also a crossover from quantity to quality, since the likelihood of the lock-on of one target by several units of self-guiding weaponry increases. The complete destruction of equal targets proves impossible, target distribution becomes random and the expenditure of ordnance increases in geometric progression.

We will consider the problem of the engagement of the PDO. Are the manpower and equipment sufficient for it? Strikes against planned targets are able to disable no more than half of the opposing forces. The experience of wars and exercises in recent years has shown that up to a quarter of them are not hit at all, due to changes in location. Another 25 percent retain their fighting ability as a consequence of inaccuracy of fire or of being well protected.

Small and well-camouflaged point targets (reinforced-concrete DOSs [permanent emplacements], armored pillboxes) and maneuverable targets—tanks, BMPs, SAUs—are not very vulnerable. Air power is called in to destroy them, as a rule. The reaction time is 30—40 minutes, however, even when the interaction is finely streamlined. That means that an assault should have sufficient firepower, a large ammunition load and its own helicopters in a vigorous battle at the shore.

No matter how massed the application of attack and bomber aviation and missile troops (with conventional warheads), it will not be possible to achieve effective enemy defeat without their own artillery and combat helicopters. The experience of the battles in Afghanistan testifies to this. Artillery and combat helicopters remain the most accurate weapons as before.

Special-purpose and specially structured fire-support ships are also necessary to destroy planned targets not hit by aviation, as well as newly discovered targets. But that is a topic for separate discussion.

But what must be done first of all? A division intended for operations as part of a naval assault should be close in composition and armaments to an assault-attack division. The MP brigade and assault motorized-rifle regiment are best re-equipped with amphibious vehicles,

and refinements should also be ordered from industry for "hypothetically amphibious vehicles." First, supply them with the Osa amphibious SAM system, and each battalion with the Konkurs PTUR BM. Second, increase the buoyancy of the BMPs, 2S9 Nona 120mm SAO and the 2S1 Gvozdika 122mm howitzer. Third, mount the Grad RSZO and its transport and reloading vehicle on a tracked, amphibious base. Fourth, give each MP (or motorized-rifle) platoon up to three carriers at the forward edge of the battle area for maneuvering rapidly on the battlefield using portable firepower, bringing up ammunition and evacuating the wounded.

Finally, most importantly, make the marine infantry platoon (up to 40 men) a combat entity with a full complement of firepower and protection. It should be armed with portable PTURs, PZRKs, automatic and manual grenade launchers and flamethrowers. Its composition should include combat engineers, snipers and a paramedic. Each assault soldier should naturally be provided with a bullet-proof vest and a frogman-type suit with chemical warming.

Some of the combat gear should be on special amphibious BMPs (for delivery from supply vessels) and in containers (for delivery by helicopters). The rear support is now able to begin supply, in the best case, after 24 hours provided the assault offensive has been successful. If the dimensions of the beachhead are less than twelve kilometers across and four kilometers in depth, supply looks to be problematical, since the priority of the cargo and the variations for its delivery have not been determined. The structure of the rear-support bodies of the assault and their outfitting should obviously also be reviewed apropos of the specific features of combat operations.

#### Footnote

I. Aleksandr Vasilyevich Bobrakov is deputy chief of the VVMIU [Higher Naval Aviation School] (city of St. Petersburg). He used to be commander of a brigade of destroyers. He has a great deal of experience in the command of a fire-support detachment for an assault and the supervision of a division staff of marine assault forces in the Baltic Fleet.

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#### Shipbuilding Issues

##### Future of Northern Yard for Civilian Shipbuilding Robust

93UM0534E Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
17 Apr 93 p 4

[Article by Valeriy Streletsov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, under rubric "Defense Complex: Voice of the Yards": "Northern Yard: The Shock Is Over. What Next?"]

[Text] At the Northern Yard (now the Northern Yard Joint-Stock Company), St. Petersburg shipbuilders saw the destroyer Nastoychivyy, which they built, off to her permanent station. But it was hard to call the ship-builders' mood festive even on such an uncommon day...

"The volume of Ministry of Defense orders was cut in half for us just in the past two years," says Yuriy Bokov, Northern Yard general director. "Production capacities working for defense are only 20-percent activated."

The buildup in output of those products which previously took a back seat saved them. With the mediation of the Raznoeksport Joint-Stock Company they managed to obtain funds, with which dry cargo vessels are being built today for the civilian fleet and capacities are being expanded for manufacturing heat exchangers, electrodes, furniture and much more. Thus, neither catastrophic layoffs of workers nor a reduction in production capacities followed. To the contrary, already today many of those specialists who left the enterprise two years ago, tempted by promises of joint ventures, small enterprises and cooperatives, are asking to be taken back.

After overcoming the state of shock, Northern Yard stockholders already have an opportunity to provide their workers with social protection. For example, what cooperative can boast of a clinic where a month's stay for one person costs only R2,500 even under conditions of present high prices? The yard also has vacation facilities, children's establishments and a polyclinic on its balance sheet, and the shipbuilders' wages have begun to rise, albeit not as fast as they would like.

But you wouldn't call the general director's mood optimistic.

"We are preserving our potential, albeit not in the previous volume," says Yuriy Lvovich Bokov, "but will our related armament people, instrument makers and others preserve theirs? We were forced to give up their services due to the sharp reduction in finances coming from the Ministry of Defense. This means their scientific and production potential was threatened. Then what is to be done about new weapon systems and instrument systems for which modern ships experience an acute need? Six destroyers, sisters of Nastoychivyy, have been laid down at the Northern Yard. What will be their fate without these systems? And are they themselves to be if construction of only one ship was financed for 1993, and even then not completely?"

It is not only navymen, who have an extreme need to renew the ship inventory, who are awaiting a government decision on the fate of these ships. The ship-builders also are waiting—the yard needs prospects, for a ship is not built at a stroke.

And as yard personnel told me, foreign buyers are contemplating the destroyers frozen on the ways...

### Various Commercial Vessels, Equipment for Sale

93UM0534F Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
17 Apr 93 p 4

[Advertisement under rubric "Defense Complex": "Supply and Demand"]

[Text]

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
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### Ship Retirements Exceed New Construction

93UM0534G Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
17 Apr 93 p 4

[Unattributed article under rubric "Defense Complex": "We Are Building Less Than We Are Writing Off"]

[Text] All of last year the Navy received 28 new ships and submarines. Five nuclear powered submarines, one diesel-electric submarine, two destroyers, two coastal minesweepers, one small ASW ship, one Zubr-Class surface effect ship, and several missile and other craft came to replace 116 written-off naval vessels. The heavy air-capable cruiser Minsk, the gun-armed cruiser Murmansk, large ASW ships, and 21 submarines were sent



off to the ship graveyard. Some ships (mainly small ships) were written off because of age, but more were due to the absence of a ship repair facility and the impossibility of extending the service life of relatively new ships.

Ships also "departed" for national "quarters." Ukraine hoisted the yellow and blue ensign over a patrol ship from Donuzlav and privatized a reconnaissance ship, a patrol ship and a surface effect ship being built for other fleets (these are among those ready for commissioning by the beginning of this year). Georgia received "its own" share of the Black Sea Fleet, and the Azerbaijani Navy was augmented by eight ships and seven small craft at the expense of the Caspian Flotilla order of battle. And the Baltic Fleet is transferring two small ASW ships and motor torpedo boats to Lithuania.

#### **Heavy Nuclear Cruiser Petr Velikiy Still Not Finished**

93UM0534H Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
17 Apr 93 p 4

[Caption under picture of heavy nuclear powered cruiser Petr Velikiy, under rubric "Defense Complex"]

[Text] The heavy nuclear powered cruiser Petr Velikiy was planned to be commissioned by the end of 1991. A difficult fate befell the last of a series of ships which were given names of prominent naval leaders: work essentially was not carried out on her for two years due to the absence of financing. Meanwhile, the Petr Velikiy is not simply a symbol of Russian naval might, but also a

powerful combat complex in which many unique technologies and design solutions are realized. This super-modern cruiser is needed by the Navy. Realizing this, the Ministry of Defense did everything possible to find funds to complete construction. Today around a thousand highly skilled Baltic Yard specialists are performing installation work on the ship.

#### **CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES**

##### **MoD Official on Assisting WGF Forces in Transiting to Russia**

93UM0583A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
28 May 93 p 2

[Interview with Col Nikolay Dmitrievich Nevolko, head of the Military Transport Service of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, by Col Valeriy Kovaliev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Transit Through Belarus"]

[Text] For several years now trainloads of servicemen, combat weapons and military property have been travelling from the countries of East Europe. An enormous relocation of troops is underway. Most of them are relocated to Russia through the territory of Belarus.

The Military Transport Service of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus provides its Russian colleagues with considerable assistance in organizing the transportation.

[Kovalev] Nikolay Dmitrievich, what does the Military Transport Service of the Belarusian Army do by way of providing for the transit of Russian troops and cargo through the territory of Belarus?

[Nevolko] Following the breakup of the USSR the unified rail system was divided among the states formed out of the former Union, as we know, and there were no contractual commitments among them. The troop withdrawal proceeded normally, however. It became urgent to decide on how payment for the hauls was to be handled, on the provision of rolling stock, the licensing of and the establishment of quotas for freight.

Fortunately, this confusion did not last long. In May of 1992 the CIS heads of government signed an agreement and then came to an agreement among themselves and the Commonwealth railroads, as well as the defense ministries of Belarus and Russia. Our service now provides for hauls transiting the republic, while Russia covers the expenses involved. The transshipment base at Brest handles the transshipment operations and provides security in the transshipment area, which means that it operates almost exclusively for the Russian army. We also provide security personnel to accompany the transports, fuel, water and food.

[Kovalev] How extensive are the shipments?

[Nevolko] I can tell you frankly that they are considerable. When formations and units of the SGV [Northern Group of Forces] and ZGV [Western Group of Forces] were being withdrawn simultaneously, an average of up to 3,500 freight cars and flatcars passed through Belarus each month. This involved many, many thousands of pieces of combat equipment and hundreds of thousands of tons of various kinds of freight, including graded freight requiring special handling. Things became somewhat easier following completion of the troop withdrawal from Poland, but we are still processing up to 2,000 freight cars and flatcars en route from the ZGV and dispatching them eastward every month.

[Kovalev] The schedule for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany is full once again. One would assume that shipments would grow also as a result....

[Nevolko] In our times it is risky to make any kind of predictions, but I do not think that we will let Russia down. Not everything depends upon us, however. In order to ensure uninterrupted shipments we must also have an uninterrupted supply of empty cars. Right now Belarus does not have enough of them. The working stock of railcars was divided up, of course, but they have not yet been marked, and many Belarusian freight cars and flatcars are meandering around the expanses of the CIS. Those sent to Brest from Russia to be loaded frequently disappear somewhere along the way. I therefore ask the Russian colleagues to get this under control.

There is yet another problem requiring a joint effort. We set up so-called warming cars for the transport guards. We install heaters in their cars, make bunks for them and so forth. The cars leave and are usually not returned to

us. We have to start all over for the new freight trains. But where are we to get the pipe, the boards, the stoves? We manage to get some things, but our capabilities, particularly financial, unfortunately, are extremely limited. And, you will agree, it is not right to send personnel off in an empty, cold car. I hope the VOSO [Military Transport] Service will not regard this as unimportant and that we can resolve the matter jointly.

I have already described the role of our transshipment base in the smooth functioning of the transport conveyor belt. It has experienced serious difficulties, unfortunately, since the breakup of the Union and the cessation of centralized supply. There is a shortage of loading machinery in working condition, heavy equipment, spare parts, batteries.... We cannot obtain all of these things in the republic. We need help from Russia's Ministry of Defense.

[Kovalev] The situation is clear with respect to freight shipments. But then there are also passengers, Russia's servicemen and their families. The editors recently received a letter from Sr Lt Merkulov, who is serving in the ZGV. He wrote that it is almost impossible for Russian officers to acquire a ticket for the Moscow-Bünsdorf train at Brest. The commandant allegedly demands 10 dollars for a seat on the "Seventeen," claiming that there is a directive from superiors....

[Nevolko] There is a problem with tickets. Train No. 17 is made up in Moscow. We are authorized to attach only one car to it in Brest. There are frequently not enough seats for all those wanting them. Some people have to wait for the next train. With respect to a fixed "rate" of 10 dollars, no one has issued such instructions to the station commandant.

We in the VOSO do not separate military personnel into "ours" and "theirs" at all. People are assigned seats within the quotas allocated to us, regardless of whether they serve in the Belarusian, Russian or Ukrainian military. The fact that there are frequently not enough seats is another matter. People en route to TDY assignments receive tickets first.

#### Update on Strategic Missile Force Drive for Contract Recruits

93UM0585A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
29 May 93 p 3

[Article by Lt Col Aleksandr Dolinin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Pros' Into the Strategic Missile Troops"]

[Text]

#### Our First Experience With Contract Service Needs to Be Studied

The term "contract service" is actually new to us but is becoming increasingly common. In accordance with the decree passed by the government of the Russian Federation, "On Measures for Effecting the Phased Transition

**to Manning the Armed Forces With Volunteer Personnel—Under Contract,"** "pros" are being recruited into the army and navy. A directive from the deputy minister of defense defines the procedure for concluding the contracts. This year 8 billion rubles has been allocated for this purpose. The process of manning the forces with volunteers is not proceeding the same everywhere, however.

Today we discuss the state of affairs with respect to recruitment for contract service in the Strategic Missile Troops, the most unusual branch of the armed forces in this respect.

Lt Gen Vladislav Putilin, chief of the Organizational and Mobilizational Directorate of the RVSN [Strategic Missile Troops], told me in an interview that the recruitment of contract personnel is proceeding smoothly and that it has unlimited possibilities.

The actual concept of manning the forces solely by contract cannot be considered ideal, however. Life has taught us that contract recruitment and a draft together make it possible to develop battleworthy missile troops. Extremes are unacceptable. The same conclusions were drawn by a military council of the RVSN with participation by commanders at all levels in the division, one of the first to begin the experiment.

What is the basis for these conclusions? Service under contract is such a new phenomenon that the understanding of its essence changes as those employing it gain experience. Just three months ago, for example, many people assumed that the contract had to do primarily with manning problems. Matters of an organizational, organic nature have now become acute. The specific nature of the troops is such that it would be desirable to man with contract personnel primarily the combat crews, which have 24-hour duty. The hitch, however, is that contract military personnel are officially equated with officers. And it is perfectly justified to give them the prescribed days-off and extensive leave time, and to regulate their work day. This means that in order to convert all of the combat missile subunits to the contract system, the organic numerical strength of the troops would have to be increased. But is this what we are attempting to achieve in our reform of the Russian armed forces?

Since contract regiments or even subunits in the RVSN cannot be formed without increasing the present numerical strength, mixed manning is the only acceptable basis. At least in the foreseeable future, when some of the specialists will be replaced with servicemen under contract and some with draftees. Only this combination will enable us to increase the numerical strength of the troops, while simultaneously bringing professionals into the military ranks. These conclusions necessitated adjustments during the course of the recruitment. It is now underway in practically all the divisions, which is making it possible to fulfill the plan without exceeding the limits on numerical strength.

The problem involved in creating the social basis for contract service, which became evident immediately, is not a new one. The housing problem for officers and warrant officers has not yet been solved, it has not been possible to provide all duty personnel with apartments, and now there are new concerns. Suffice it to say that the conversion of just one typical barracks into a residence for contract personnel will require 5 million rubles, no more and no less. The cost of furniture accounts for most of this. The problem is being resolved, however....

The contract system and the law frequently conflict. The troops eagerly wait for the Regulations on the Procedure for Performing Military Service to be issued, which will eliminate many of the practical problems, as well as the approval of general military regulations.

Was it informative to learn the social characteristics of the contract misslemen? They are mainly not new to the RVSN but are extended-duty and female military personnel. There is a particularly large number of the latter. The reasons for this are perfectly clear. At remote garrisons the wives of officers and warrant officers frequently cannot find work. And when even women with small children are allowed to enter the service, there is no end to the number of applicants. Not to belittle their role, but one has to say that combat readiness does not gain from this. Many of the problems cannot be resolved even in the peacetime combat training, not to speak of a combat situation. Under present laws, as we know, they are supposed to be discharged and evacuated as members of military families. Other sensitive issues also arise in the case of women, which cannot be avoided....

In which subunits do the contract personnel most like to serve? Studies show: communications subunits. Military communications personnel were the very first contract personnel in the RVSN. They are drawn mainly by the unique and promising nature of the job. Incidentally, even those rare contract personnel coming from military commissariats request precisely these subunits. When they compare working conditions at rayon communications centers with those elsewhere, they do not regret their choice. They feel that only there can they become true professionals.

The role of military commissariats in the screening of contract personnel needs to be discussed separately. The military commissariats do not have enough personnel or means for this work. The commanders therefore bear the main burden. And, I have become convinced, those in the missile troops do not intend to shift it onto anyone else even in the future. The screening process for the missile troops is a special one, as Col Gen Aleksandr Volkov, first deputy commander in chief of the RVSN, has stressed. Not just anyone is allowed to work with missiles. And it is impermissible to shift the screening responsibility onto anyone else.

Regional specifics also have to be taken into account. In some places there are possibilities for recruitment; in

others these are limited. There is no one to recruit, because the rayons do not have the population. The climate is harsh, and there is no infrastructure in place. And if we go just for numbers and take all who are willing, we will have the same situation we have with extended-duty personnel. In these areas as many are discharged for nonconformity in a year as are recruited. So what are we to do? Return to the experience of the shock-labor construction projects and invite volunteers?

We will have to deal with this. And we need a strong publicity service. Experience has already demonstrated that the effectiveness of contract recruitment depends entirely upon the effectiveness of its promotion. We need well-organized advertising of the military service more and more in the army. Here is just one example. The promotional work was performed with diversity in one garrison in Siberia. When the command element published notices in the local press, only a few individuals responded, when it appealed by radio, dozens came, but when it held a round-table discussion on television, there were hundreds of applicants.

The problems of educating the contract personnel and their compatibility within the military collectives need to be discussed separately. They constitute a whole new field of work for agencies dealing with personnel, which are not yet firmly established. When contract personnel arrive in the subunits, you have the "common" and the "refined." A contract serviceman cannot be made to work on a daily duty detail or in the mess hall. Who is going to perform these essential jobs? What will relations be like in a subunit with contract personnel and draftees? This matter cannot be avoided.

The troops themselves are seeking a solution. It is being proposed that the KP details be made up of civilians. Garrison guards are being converted to a system of paramilitary security. This will necessitate increasing the ceiling on the numerical strength of the VOKhR [armed guards], to be sure. In short, everything possible is being done to see that a soldier does not simply shuffle papers at headquarters or peel potatoes but is where he is supposed to be—at a duty station.

There are just as many questions regarding the training of contract personnel. The missile troops can train the specialists they need themselves, sending them to special training centers. Once again we have a sensitive issue. During the proposed 6 months of training they will be paid only 30 percent of their regular rate. How can they accept this, having left their families at home—and without money at that? The laws are weak in this area.

The situation is not hopeless, however. The RVSN leadership sees the solution as one of training only specialists in the most complex fields at training centers; all of the rest, right in the units.

In short, wherever one looks, there are many problems involving contract personnel. Despite this, they are being selected for the RVSN. Everyone expects the legislators to take into account these problems, however, which are

presently becoming more and more pronounced. They also expect decisions on financing from the government. Otherwise, the manning of the armed forces with contract personnel could be delayed.

#### Siberian MD Building Housing for Returning Troops

93UM0587C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
1 Jun 93 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Aleksandr Beklich, Novosibirsk: "Siberian Military District Officers Will Have no Problems With Apartments"]

[Text] "Not a single officer's family that has arrived in the Siberian Military District as part of the military units that have been withdrawn from abroad has remained without a roof over its head," Military District Commander Colonel-General Viktor Kopylov stated in a meeting with journalists.

By 1995, the Siberian Military District will manage to totally resolve the housing problem and provide housing to nearly 5,000 servicemen if the plan for the withdrawal of units from the ZGV [Western Group of Forces], Baltic Region and Transcaucasus is totally observed.

#### Transbaykal MD CINC Tretyakov on Cutting Manpower Shortages

93UM0606A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Jun 93 p 2

[Interview with the Commander of the Transbaykal Military District, Col-Gen Valeriy Tretyakov: "Who Will Contract to Serve in the Transbaykal?"]

[Text] Probably there are fewer people willing to perform contract service in the Transbaykal Military District than there are for anywhere else. One can say without exaggeration that the district is suffocating from a shortage of service members. Some regiments have twenty or thirty soldiers and sergeants.

What are the reasons for this grave situation? What is the leadership doing to change the situation for the better?

This was the topic of conversation between our correspondent and the Commander of the Transbaykal Military District Col-Gen Valeriy Tretyakov.

[Question] Comrade Colonel-General, what is the command doing to attract young men to contract service?

[Tretyakov] After analyzing the present situation, we concluded that a precisely thought-out system of work in this area is required. We won't make it without agitation, propaganda and advertising. In practically all formations and units, methodological classes have been set up to work with candidates, and groups of experienced officers have been formed, and have swung into action. They regularly travel to enterprises and visit academic institutions, and have established close cooperation with the

local organs of authority. Individual work with soldiers and NCOs is under way in the subunits.

[Question] And still, there are few who want to join up. What do you see as the causes?

[Tretyakov] This is a new thing for us, the mechanism itself for recruiting young men to serve in the army has not been hammered out well enough yet. There are a lot of "gaps" in the normative legal base. Some questions require clarification. We are also waiting until the combined-arms regulations are finally developed and adopted.

[Question] A survey was taken among personnel of the district. What did it show?

[Tretyakov] That we must explain and publicize contract service more actively and purposefully. We still have untapped resources. Nine percent of those questioned are prepared right now to test themselves in the new capacity, and 20 percent are thinking about it. That means they can be convinced if we find good arguments in favor of the army. And they do exist. Fortunately, all the patriots and the romantics have not disappeared. They go to the airborne units to become real men. I say without exaggeration that instead of the ruble, they have another unit of measurement: honor, duty, conscience. Not all are slaves of the golden calf. Some have lost faith in the charms of the civilian life, and are ready to devote their lives to protection of the Fatherland.

Nonetheless, material incentives undoubtedly do play some role when they make the final decision. How can we attract professionals to remote garrisons of the Transbaykal steppe? At present, they do not have any sort of additional material benefits. Perhaps if housing out in the "boondocks" was a little easier to come by, family men might get apartments. And monetary maintenance out in the country and in the large cities is roughly the same. It is no accident it is precisely in the remote garrisons where the troops are experiencing an acute shortage of experienced specialists. From all appearances, in the future the material upkeep of the contract troops performing their service duties in our region should be significantly increased, and the approach more differentiated when it comes to pay.

[Question] What jobs are the most sought-after now?

[Tretyakov] Among service members who sign a contract, 35 percent are accepted for jobs as drivers. The matter is more difficult when it comes to manning those jobs upon which the combat readiness of the units and subunits depend, tank commanders, mechanic-drivers, leaders of motorized rifle squads, commanders of infantry fighting vehicles and others.

[Question] Let's try to draw a typical portrait of a professional in the Transbaykal.

[Tretyakov] As a rule he is a young man up to age thirty with secondary or secondary special education. He is married and was born in these parts. Incidentally, in the selection process we also have to consider that not

everyone tries to get into the army with good intentions. There are those who want to get access to weapons and military equipment. It is no accident that we frequently deny the contract. Perhaps this affects the quantitative indices, and the district is not among the leaders: Plans for general contract recruitment are not exceeded. But as I see it, the most important thing is quantity, but quality.

[Question] Are individual subunits created from the professionals, or do they serve alongside the other soldiers and NCOs?

[Tretyakov] There is no separation. Each serves according to the authorized job assignment in which he was accepted. This has a positive affect on the morale and psychological situation in the military outfits. The professional sets the tone, and pulls those serving with him up to his level. The situation may change somewhat in the future, and purely professional subunits will appear.

[Question] I had an opportunity to be present at a tactical-special exercise with regimental commanders, where they practiced combat command and control programs on computer. At the time it was an urgent problem that there was no one to maintain the computer equipment. Specialists of that type are not trained in the training subunits of the district. But surely the future of the young Russian Army will be a high-technology one, with broad use of computers. How can this problem be resolved?

[Tretyakov] Indeed, we are not training computer programmers or operators at the district training centers. And although new systems have still not become widespread in the line units, even now we have to think about future prospects. For the time being this matter is being handled by enthusiasts on a volunteer basis. But the time has come to put it on a serious footing. I believe that the problem may be resolved by attracting highly qualified specialists, graduates of civilian higher institutes of education, and signing contracts with them. Delay in this matter is simply unacceptable.

[Question] The first Cossack subunit is being formed in the Transbaykal Military District. To what extent will they help to resolve the problem of professionalization? How do you see the future?

[Tretyakov] Cossacks historically have been professional military men. It is cheering that this fine tradition is now being reborn in our Transbaykal region. That subunit began its existence in the autumn of last year in the district, at the base of the Port Arthur Motorized Rifle Regiment. They should be organically assimilated into the young Russian Army. We are also hoping that some of the professionals in our region will wear the yellow trouser stripes. Close contact has been established with the leadership of the Transbaykal Cossack Troop. Undoubtedly we will assist them in their new undertaking.

In short, we are taking specific steps so that the number of professionals in the district keeps growing. After all, the future belongs to them.

## UKRAINE

### General Morozov Checks Housing Sites, Scores 'Political' Snags

93UM0573A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
20 Apr 93 p 1

[Article by Lt-Col Sergey Kobyshev, "Provision of Housing to Service Members is Not Only a State Question, But a Political One as Well"]

[Text] On April 16 the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Col-Gen Konstantin Morozov, completed a working trip through construction installations of the Kiev garrison, stopped at several sites where residences are under construction for the families of officers and warrant officers, met and talked with military construction personnel, and visited the Central Design Institute of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Why the personal interest of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine in how housing construction is being carried out in the Kiev garrison?

Said Col-Gen K. Morozov, "the problem of providing service members with housing is a very urgent one for us today, one that is far beyond the capabilities of the Defense Ministry. Today it is a state problem, one on which the President of Ukraine himself, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces, is working hard. As you know, on 16 January of this year, the President issued a Decree which provided for an increase in financing of the housing construction program. The program was developed in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and envisaged the construction of 220-230 thousand apartments for service members by the end of this century. This in turn requires financing and construction rates which would assure an annual activation of 28-30 thousand apartments. If we are able to maintain [these rates], solely through our own efforts we will be able to construct buildings containing 112 thousand apartments in 7 or 8 years, which in turn will allow us to cut our army and provide apartments to service members who serve out their time, and to transfer to the Armed Forces of Ukraine officers and warrant officers who are now outside of its borders. Proceeding from this fact, the Ministry of Defense is attempting to increase the capabilities of its construction organizations.

The Minister of Defense just touched on the problems of manpower acquisition of the military construction units, although a check showed that Ukrainian legislation existing today creates nearly insuperable obstacles to this. Judge for yourself. By existing legislation, graduates of intermediate professional technical schools are freed from the draft for three years in order to gain experience in their acquired specialty. At one of the construction sites, Pvt. Anatoliy Kuznetsov, the best bricklayer of the detachment, was introduced to Col-Gen K. Morozov.

In one-and-a-half years of service, Anatoliy has laid enough brick to build 16 apartments. Not every civilian

specialist could match the soldier in his work. But Anatoliy's opinion in this regard is unequivocal: the "civilian world" doesn't give the opportunities that the army does, when it comes to improving your specialty and acquiring a related one. And now Anatoliy will remember the army from his meeting with the Minister of Defense, and from the watch which Col-Gen Morozov presented to the best specialist of the subunit.

The urgency of the housing problem in Kiev is common knowledge. For us service members it was aggravated by last year's decree, never rescinded, by the representative of the President for Kiev, which ordered a deduction of 43 percent of the constructed housing for percentage participation, instead of the 18 percent decided by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Such construction is simply extravagant for the military budget. There is one way out of this situation, construction with its own manpower. While in last years we produced around 120 to 150 apartments through our own construction, this year we shall build 680 apartments. In 1994 plans are to raise this figure to 1,000 apartments annually. And all this just by strengthening and increasing the numerical strength of the construction detachments and UNR in the city of Kiev, and by improving the effectiveness and productivity of labor. The total number of proposed new settlements should reduce the waiting list by 1,200 persons this year.

The first construction site which the Defense Minister visited was on Belichanska street. This consists of three buildings of 360 apartments, a boiler facility and a store. Convenient attachment to a school and kindergarten, the builders believe, will free the new residents of many the problems which beset new construction projects. One building is already practically ready for occupation, in the second they are concluding the finishing work, and according to plan the third will be occupied in September. As we were assured by the chief of the UNR, Lt-Col A. Mamonov, such volumes and rates of construction are quite within the capabilities of the military builders. What is more, they are prepared to increase their work volumes. But is this enough today? Most likely it is not. So in his talks with the military builders, the Defense Minister constantly repeated:

"Military builders at the present stage, along with other main directorates of the Ministry of Defense, are working to form the Army of Ukraine. You, the builders, are preparing the base. If there are no apartments, we will not be able to discharge and cut those who have already served their time. We shall not be able to cut, we shall not be able to transfer the young people, we shall not be able to accommodate graduates of the military schools."

Another question is, what should be built? We visited a four-room apartment in a beautiful building, and I must say, we were somewhat disappointed. The apartment, intended for a large family, was clearly small in terms of square meters.

Alas, unfortunately by no means everything depends on our desires and capabilities. At the present time military builders have been allowed to build only one building in accordance with their own design. The building on Kursk Street. And without exaggeration, one can say that "our" building is the best. The three-room apartment in the building on Kursk Street seemed much more spacious and cozy to us than the four-room apartment on Belichanska Street.

So we can do the designing ourselves, as well as the building. I was once more convinced of this at the Central Design Institute of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry. The visit there by the Minister of Defense had to do with a well-known housing construction project for service members, consisting of 1,500 apartments, near Narodnoye Opolcheniye Street. It is remarkable that the design of the settlement itself was made right in our institute, and that our specialists handled all questions accompanying the main design.

By the end of the year, we calculate the first assignment of ready apartments will amount to some 300 to 500 apartments. Conclusion of the main volume of construction is expected for the fourth quarter of 1994.

What did the Minister of Defense of Ukraine gain from this trip? After becoming acquainted with the progress of the work at the installations, how does he himself assess the prospects for resolution of the current housing problem?

"The trip enabled me to see the correctness of the strategic course on which we have embarked, toward strengthening and enlarging the existing military construction detachments and reforming some of them into construction regiments" noted Col-Gen Konstantin Morozov. "Learning about the installations and talking with the personnel also convinced me that military builders are successfully coping with the increased volumes of construction, that with the appropriate support of our program, and now we are receiving this support at the highest level, we can speak confidently of prospects for eliminating the largest waiting list of apartment-less service members, which now amounts to 59.4 thousand persons in the Armed Forces, in the coming two or three years."

#### **Missile-Space Administration Chief Col Litvinov on Program Plans**

*93UM0573B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
10 Apr 93 pp 1-2*

[Interview with the Chief of the Administration of Missile-Space Weapons of the Ukraine Ministry of Defense, Col Valeriy Arkadyevich Litvinov: "Ukraine Has Been and Will Continue To Be a Space Power"]

[Text] The broad capabilities of spacecraft have always attracted military specialists. The degree of participation of the military department in the implementation of national space programs testifies to the level of combat

readiness of the armed forces and to their equipment with the most up-to-date technology. With the dissolution of the USSR, elements of the military space infrastructure and well-trained cadres were left on the territory of Ukraine, allowing us to count on our own military space forces, and on Ukraine's retention of the status of space power.

On the eve of Cosmonautics Day, we give the floor to the Chief of the Administration of Missile-Space Weapons of the Ukraine Ministry of Defense, Col Valeriy Arkadyevich LITVINOV.

[Question] Valeriy Arkadyevich, why was it necessary to create an Administration of Missile-Space Weapons (URKV) within the structure of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense?

[Litvinov] Ukraine is a historically developed space power. Suffice to say that practically 50 percent of the developmental work on spacecraft, and their manufacture, took place in design bureaus and at enterprises of our state. It is no secret that the most powerful booster rocket in the world, the "Zenit," was developed at the "Yuzhnoye" design bureau and built at the Yuzhmash plant at Dnepropetrovsk.

It makes no sense at all for us to lose the status of space power. And not only because 20 percent of the work places and 40 percent of the scientific developmental work in Ukraine are associated with the space field. We cannot forget that development of an up-to-date armed forces is inconceivable without the use of space means. The experience of the recent war in the Near East made this quite evident.

As I see it, we have everything necessary to create our own military space forces. After the dissolution of the USSR, many elements of a space infrastructure have remained on the territory of Ukraine, including unique apparatus utilized in the conduct of international space programs. To this day all of this equipment has been kept in complete combat readiness.

In addition, many officers with work experience in the space-launch facilities of the former USSR, who actively participated in research work, are serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Many such specialists are also in our administration. For example, Col Yevgeniy Makhonin has 20 years of test work at the "Plesetsk" space-launch facility to his credit, and served in all the positions from test engineer to chief of one of the leading departments. Lt-Col Vitaliy Menyaylo and Col Aleksandr Serdyuk have similar military biographies. Young officers such as Cand. of Technical Sciences Major Sergey Kapshtyk are similar to them.

These specialists are ready and able to work at the level of international requirements and to make a maximal contribution to the development of Ukrainian missile-space technology.

[Question] Nonetheless, even though it has significant scientific and technical potential, is Ukraine capable of realizing space programs, including those in the military field?

[Litvinov] Today perhaps no state of the CIS can fully realize its space programs independently. Even Russia, which continues to launch a large number of spacecraft. Design bureaus and enterprises of many CIS countries take part in their development and creation.

Ukraine lacks a whole group of vital fragments of the space infrastructure: launch ranges, date receiving and processing centers, etc. So at the first stage it is economically advantageous for us to actively cooperate with Russian specialists. First of all this allows us to maintain due readiness of the equipment and the teamwork of the crews maintaining it. Second, we can utilize the information obtained from satellites in the interests of navigation and the domestic economy.

But the most important thing is that in this way we prepare our equipment and the necessary cadres for the second stage, realization of our own program of space research. I stress that the National Space Agency of Ukraine jointly with the Administration of Missile-Space Weapons of the Ministry of Defense have prepared a model of a unified space program which reflects the interests of science, the domestic economy, and defense.

Development of our own spacecraft is part of our plans. However due to the high population density of Ukraine, clearly they must be launched from the Russian space-launch facility of "Plesetsk" or from the "Baykonur" facility in Kazakhstan. As you see, here too we cannot get by without cooperation. We have therefore worked up a package of documents which would regulate procedures for cooperation between powers to implement space operations.

[Question] What are the basic tasks facing the URKV?

[Litvinov] Let me say this at the start. The resources of command, control, and telemetry complexes in our country have been detached from the spacecraft control system. The grouping of orbital assets for various purposes, which were developed through the resources of all the CIS countries, is used by Russia, and in our opinion inadequately satisfies the interests of Ukraine.

We believe that the work of our administration should be aimed first of all at eliminating these distortions. At the initial level, the basic efforts of specialists of the URKV will be concentrated on connection of our ground and maritime command, control and telemetry complexes to

the control system for support of piloted flights. There is already such an agreement with the leadership of the Russian Space Agency. There is not one yet with the command of the military-space forces of the Russian Defense Ministry.

In mid-April plans are to conduct spacecraft control test sessions, with participation of Ukrainian command, control and telemetry complexes.

We must develop a draft agreement with Russia and Kazakhstan regarding joint use of launch complexes of the space-launch facilities of "Plesetsk" and "Baykonur" to launch booster rockets carrying national spacecraft.

Subsequently we will increase the grouping of spacecraft in order to implement our national space program.

[Question] The creation of military space means is quite an expensive proposition. Don't you think that it is too burdensome for the economy of Ukraine?

[Litvinov] Space programs have always been very expensive. As for military space, its share is just 20 percent of the total sum of expenditures of our state for space operations.

Investment of finances in the creation of space means for communication, navigation and observation makes it possible to sharply reduce expenditures to maintain similar means which are based elsewhere. This is due to the greater capabilities of space means. In addition, the increase in effectiveness of troop command and control makes it possible to reduce the numerical strength of the Armed Forces while maintaining combat capabilities. This is the main savings in resources going to maintain the army.

Also, remember that any number of military space systems can be used in the interests of the domestic economy (communications, navigation, ecological monitoring).

And finally, because of the need to assure maximally attainable characteristics, the investment of money into the space field, especially the military field, is financing of leading-edge technologies. Of course this does not bring an immediate profit. But let's not forget an essential requirement for survival in the world market, competitiveness of industrial production, and the familiar proverb: "Penny wise and pound foolish."

[Interviewer] At the conclusion of our talk, allow me to congratulate you Valeriy Arkadyevich, the personnel of the military-space units, and workers in branches of industry participating in the creation of missile-space technology, on the occasion of Cosmonautics Day.

[Litvinov] Thank you.

**Russian 'Expert': Ukraine Can't Use Nuclear Weapons**

*93UM0601A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 3 Jun 93 p 5*

[Article by Sergey Grigoryev, military expert, under the rubric "Disarmament": "What Is Ukraine to Do With the Nuclear Legacy From the USSR?"]

[Text]

**Cooperation Between the Military-Industrial Departments of the Two Nations Is Inevitable"**

The mass media have recently discussed Ukraine's nuclear weapons extensively. The discussion is mainly a political one. The technical military aspects of the issue are practically not considered. Let us try to fill this gap.

Remember that there are no longer any tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Incidentally, the removal of the tactical nuclear warheads from former republics of the USSR, carried out without extra fanfare or incidents, will undoubtedly be regarded as a service by the military leadership of the USSR and Russia and of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.

The strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine consist of formations and units of the 43rd Missile Army and the 46th Air Army of the former Soviet Union. Two missile divisions of the 43rd Army have a total of 176 silo-based RS-18 and RS-22 intercontinental ballistic missiles (NATO refers to them as the SS-19 Stiletto and SS-24 Scalpel, respectively). The 46th Army has 43 various modifications of the Tu-160 (Blackjack) and Tu-95 (Bear) strategic bombers (including the Tu-95MS, which delivers cruise missiles). According to the Russian press these carriers are capable of delivering 1,880 nuclear payloads to targets. Ukraine is behind only Russia and the USA in numbers of strategic nuclear munitions. An assessment of the capability of a grouping of nuclear forces, however, requires more than just counting the number of delivery vehicles and the number of weapons on them. The methods used for this kind of assessment are complicated, but certain important elements can be pointed out.

**The Conformity of Existing Weapons to the Missions of the Armed Forces**

I would not be so bold as to define the directions and priorities of Ukraine's military strategy, but I would indicate that this state's main areas of interest and potential enemies are in the Eastern Hemisphere. Obviously Ukraine cannot afford to compete with the United States either now or in the foreseeable future. In the light of this the effective strength of the Ukrainian nuclear forces is not the optimal, since the RS-18 and RS-22 missiles and the Tu-160 and Tu-95 bombers were created primarily for striking targets located in North America. The fact that they are not the optimal entails a number of problems in both the technical and the military areas. They include difficulty in destroying

nearby targets, high maintenance costs, poor flexibility of employment and extensive requirements with respect to covering forces.

Ukraine's potential opponents can only be glad that the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles was implemented before the breakup of the USSR. Otherwise, Ukraine would now have a powerful grouping of nuclear missiles corresponding to its geopolitical situation.

**Command and Control of Nuclear Forces**

We shall be using the term "command and control" here to mean a broad group of matters having to do with planning the combat employment of the weapons, assessing the situation, adopting the decision to employ the weapons, delivering the decision to the personnel and weapons, and ascertaining the results of the strike. The fact must be mentioned that the contribution of these factors to the results of warfare is constantly growing. Improving the command and control system and procedures sometimes has a greater effect than increasing the number of delivery vehicles or warheads. You will recall that lack of attention to command and control of troops and weapons resulted in the destruction of Iraq's air defenses in the very initial phase of the Persian Gulf War.

I have to say that the problems of command and control of Ukraine's nuclear forces cannot be resolved satisfactorily at the present time. The entire system of military agencies which select targets for the weapons and prepare the target designations is concentrated in Russia. The Ukrainian missiles are targeted either at nothing or at targets set for them in plans for the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR. An extremely great effort will be required for Ukraine to create its own system for planning nuclear strikes.

This is not merely a matter of monetary outlays. A relatively small number of skilled specialists working with highly classified information took part in the creation of these systems. Both the specialists and the information remained mainly in Russia. The technical means of command and control of the strategic weapons were originally designed to have maximum resistance to unskilled (or criminal) intervention. It is no accident that the possibility of blocking the employment of the nuclear weapons at a command from Russia presents a problem for Ukraine today.

The simple duplication of the expertise of others is unacceptable in designing ASUs [automatic systems of control and command] for nuclear weapons. The technical facilities and organizational procedures for such systems must include something known to no one except a small group of responsible individuals. Otherwise, there is no certainty that the nuclear forces will perform their mission when this is required and will not execute it at some other point in time. A fairly long time will pass before such Ukrainian "jewels" can be created and used. I would note that it would be fairly difficult to conceive of a quality system of command, control and target preparation without thorough testing.

#### Technical Maintenance Problems

Constant maintenance is required on the missile and aircraft systems and elements of the infrastructure in order to maintain them in a state of repair and battle-worthiness. Modern weapons are so complex that for a long time into the future only enterprises in the industry will be capable of this. The best results are achieved when technical oversight over the maintenance and repair is exercised by the actual designers and manufacturers of the weapons. One has to say that it would be very difficult for Ukraine to accomplish this on its own.

By a quirk of fate, in Ukraine, where all of the essential components for the nuclear weapons were produced (the missile itself, the command and control devices, sighting devices and the communication systems), there are no missile systems made up exclusively of Ukrainian components. It is also possible that we should speak not of a quirk of fate in this instance, but of foresight on the part of political and military leaders of the former USSR. I would point out that following the demarcation of the republics, Russia itself could have problems servicing the RS-16 and RS-20 missiles, as well as the sighting devices in many missile systems.

There is no question that Ukraine's technological capability would enable it to manufacture practically any components of strategic missiles, with the exception of the nuclear munitions. Major modifications of the weapons will require flight tests, however. And these would be impossible without the cooperation of Russia or Kazakhstan, because there are no missile ranges in Ukraine. The lack of testing facilities constitutes one of the most substantial barriers to the perfection of the Ukrainian nuclear weapons and the command and control systems for the strategic forces.

Much of what has been said applies also to the strategic bombers. Furthermore, unlike fixed-base modern missiles, aircraft require a lot of fuel and contain many components which must be regularly replaced or repaired (the engines, for example). A satisfactory solution to these problems will most likely not be found in the near future without Russia's participation.

#### Safety Problems

When the work of maintaining the weapons in a state of repair is performed poorly this will inevitably affect also operating safety. This problem is frequently exaggerated, but a 100-ton missile containing toxic fuel elements is indeed a thing of extra danger. We have read in the press about a serious incident involving an American Titan-2 missile (very similar to the RS-18, incidentally). The missile blew up when technical maintenance was being performed, resulting in human casualties, and it could have caused radioactive contamination of the area.

Another aspect of the safety problem is that of preventing the accidental or unauthorized launching of missiles, which, unlike the explosion in the silo, could result in a disaster for the entire planet. This complex

subject warrants a separate discussion. I would comment only, that technical devices, organizational procedures and the personnel within the system of command and control of the nuclear systems, which Ukraine still has to create, will have to constitute the main barriers to a negligent individual or a saboteur.

#### Military Problems

Even a powerful grouping of nuclear missiles and bombers cannot execute a combat mission in modern warfare in isolation from other elements of the armed forces. Without interaction and without the resolution of matters of combat support, nuclear weapons are good only for soliciting funds for their destruction. It would seem that many problems of this nature in the Ukrainian armed forces are a long way from being solved at the present time. These problems include strategic reconnaissance, space communications, warning of a missile attack, PVO [air defense] and PRO [antimissile defense] for nuclear facilities, technical nuclear support and many others. Obviously, the independent resolution of these matters will take many years and involve very great expense.

Hopes of providing military security with a single component of the armed forces (even a very powerful one) are in vain. More than in any other field of human endeavor, success in military development is dependent upon a comprehensive, whole-system approach. The matter is complicated by the fact that potential enemies are not standing still. Influenced by technological progress, the nature of warfare is changing rapidly. Only constant improvement of the equipment can guarantee that the enemy's latest achievements will not make the available weapons obsolete, useless or even dangerous to the possessor. For those who are uncertain of their ability to take part in this arduous race it is cheaper to withdraw at the very beginning of the route, for, unfortunately, the end is not yet in sight.

#### Summation

A discussion of the technical military aspects of Ukrainian weapons brings up a number of questions. The sovereign right and difficult obligation to answer them lies with Ukraine.

1. From where does the danger to the state's security come?
2. What principles underlie the military policy?
3. Is it essential that the republic have nuclear weapons?
4. What kind of nuclear weapons does Ukraine need?
5. Should the nuclear legacy of the USSR be maintained in the Ukrainian armed forces?
6. Is Ukraine capable of maintaining the nuclear weapons in a state of battle-readiness?
7. Will the Ukrainian nuclear weapons not pose a greater danger in peacetime than in time of war?

There is no simple and obvious answer to any of these questions. It would be difficult just to enumerate all of the political, economic, military and sociopsychological factors which have to be considered in resolving this matter. The absence of real cooperation between the defense departments and military industry of Ukraine and Russia in this situation would appear unjustified.

## BELARUS

### Officers' Group Resists Ban on Political Activity of Servicemen

*93UM0583B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 21 May 93 p 3*

[Article by Valeriy Kovalev and Anatoliy Stasovskiy:  
"The BZV Did Not Want to Give in"]

[Text] It was reported in the 13 May issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that the Belarusian parliament had adopted an amendment to the Law "On the Status of Servicemen," in accordance with which the republic's army is to be totally depoliticized. Following the amendment Col Gen Pavel Kozlovskiy, minister of defense of Belarus, issued an order prohibiting political activity in the army. After that most of the officers chose military service over politics. Only the members of the Belarusian Servicemen's Association (BZV—the Belarusian abbreviation for the name of the movement) did not accept the amendment or the order. The main reason given by the organization's leaders was that the BZV, they said, was a patriotic social and not a political organization. This was stated in a letter to the editors from the BZV executive committee in response to a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article. Among other things, the letter stressed the fact that the Belorussian Servicemen's Association is not a political movement and does not engage in determining priorities in the foreign or domestic policy of Belarus.

Since then the republic's office of the public prosecutor has assessed the goals and methods of the BZV. Based on its study, it concluded that the movement's activities are unlawful and detrimental to the republic's armed forces. Following this conclusion almost all of the regular military personnel quit the organization.

After the passage of the amendment to the Law "On the Status of Servicemen" and after the Belarusian minister of defense issued the order banning political activity in the army, the BZV succeeded in "distinguishing" itself once more. Lt Col Nikolay Statkevich, an instructor at the Minsk Higher Military Engineering School and chairman of the movement's council, affixed his signature to a statement by a number of parties and movements opposed to Belarus' participation in the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS. This was a demonstrative expression of disagreement with the decision adopted by the republic's Supreme Soviet on the matter.

The chairman of the BZV council also refused to cancel his membership in the movement, as many other officers

who belonged to the organization did. After that it was time for resolute actions by the Ministry of Defense of Belarus. Lt Col Nikolay Statkevich has been discharged into the reserve by order of Pavel Kozlovskiy, the republic's minister of defense.

### Dep Mod Gen Sikora on FRG-Funded Housing for Returning Servicemen

*93UM05894 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
1 Jun 93 p 2*

[Interview with Republic of Belarus Deputy Minister of Defense for Construction and Troop Billeting Major-General Anatoliy Antonovich Sikora by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Valeriy Kovalev: "The Army of Belarus: Housing for the Military"]

[Text] In accordance with the 9 October 1990 agreement between the governments of the USSR and the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], the German side was obligated to allocate 7.8 billion marks for the construction of housing for the troops being withdrawn from its territory. Approximately one sixth of that housing is being built in Belarus. Our correspondent discusses the course of the construction and the prospects for resolving the housing problem in the Belarus Army with Republic of Belarus Deputy Minister of Defense for Construction and Troop Billeting Major-General Anatoliy Sikora.

[Kovalev] Anatoliy Antonovich, the first months of this year became a time of new housing for people in uniform in the republic—three military facilities that were built using resources allocated by Germany were put into operation...

[Sikora] Our contractors precisely fulfilled their contractual obligations and turned over housing in Marinaya Gorka—780 apartments, in Baranovichi—600 apartments, and in Slonim—1,455 apartments. Furthermore, a 725-apartment facility in Borisov was placed into operation in December 1991. Construction of three more facilities will be completed this year—in Lida, Bereza and Ross. So, 5,938 apartments with a total area of 351,094 square meters will be built in the republic for the 867 million marks granted by the FRG.

[Kovalev] What firms are conducting the construction? Are you satisfied with the quality of the work?

[Sikora] The Turkish firms "Enka" and "Tekser" and the Finnish firm "Khaka" were the first to arrive. The Turks have already fulfilled their obligations on the contracts. Specialists of the German firms "Arge Benoba" and "Elbo Bau" and of the Finnish firm "Khaka" are working on the erection of the remaining three facilities. Several Belarusian construction organizations are playing the role of subcontractors. The quality of the work is good. Along with the housing, social-cultural everyday life facilities—schools, kindergartens, outpatient clinics and trading centers are also being put into operation. In a word, all the conditions for a normal life are being created for the new tenants...

[Kovalev] As you have said, nearly 6,000 apartments will be built for the resources allocated by Germany. But obviously this will only alleviate the acuteness of the housing problem...

[Sikora] You are correct. The apartments in the facilities that have been built and are being built are intended for servicemen who are being withdrawn from Germany. And in our country, besides them, another nearly 10,000 families of officers and warrant officers need housing. We are expecting the return to the republic of more than 9,000 servicemen from the CIS countries, graduates of military academies and schools. So the housing built with the resources allocated by the FRG actually only alleviate but can hardly solve the problem. We ourselves are faced with totally eliminating it.

Last year, military builders turned over 2,102 apartments for occupancy. At the present time, we plan to build nearly 1.5 times as many—3,140 apartments. We could build even more new homes—our capacity permits this but there aren't enough budget resources. We are tying definite hopes with the activity of the republic Ministry of Defense commercial directorate. The resources received at the expense of selling excess military equipment and vehicles that are being released as a result of the reductions of the army, the barracks fund, depots, storage areas and other facilities will be directed toward housing construction in the largest possible amounts.

[Kovalev] Russian troops are temporarily deployed on republic territory. As far as I know, over 2,500 families of Russian officers and warrant officers do not have their own corner...

[Sikora] The situation is really difficult. Many of these families will be on Belarus soil for a few more years and obviously a part of them will remain even after the troop withdrawals—for permanent residence. It is clear that housing needs to be built for them.

And we are building and will continue to build it. For example, the Strategic Missile Forces command authorities have requested that we build several apartment

buildings for the missileers. The customer has allocated the required resources and during the first six months our construction directorate will turn over three apartment buildings with 220 apartments for the missileers.

Housing construction cooperatives are being created right now at Russian Air Force units deployed on Belarus territory. We'll begin building apartment buildings at two air garrisons as they are formed. I have already said that our capacity permits us to build more but everything comes up against financing the work. This issue is being discussed between the Russian and Belarusian sides within the negotiations on the strategic forces that are temporarily deployed on the territory of the Republic of Belarus. We need to think that a solution will be found.

[Kovalev] Quite a few officers of the Russian Armed Forces are natives of Belarus. If they return to the Homeland after their release into the reserve, will they be able to obtain housing?

[Sikora] Unfortunately, I cannot answer that question definitively at the present time. Although it is obvious that we need to resolve this and as soon as possible. People who have given the best years of their lives to fulfilling their military duty are not at fault because they have had to complete their service in the army of another state. I hope that this problem will be reviewed at the intergovernmental level and will be resolved while considering the interests of servicemen already in the near future.

**FROM THE EDITORIAL STAFF.** When the interview with Major-General A. Sikora had already been prepared for press, our correspondent in Belarus reported that the Republic of Belarus Council of Ministers had adopted a decree "On Immediate Measures To Provide Housing and the Social Protection of Servicemen". There is a paragraph in that document that concerns the provision of housing to individuals who have been released into the reserve or retired in the armed forces of other states and who have arrived for residence in the republic. They have been granted the right to build individual homes or cooperative apartments at their own expense. And although the bank grants beneficial credits for construction, they have to pay them off totally from their own pockets.

## ARMS TRADE

### **Aug-Sep Zhukovskiy Air Expo Catalog, Offer for Exhibitor Listings**

**93UM0625B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA**  
in Russian 5 Jun 93 p 4

[Article: "Hurry If You Want to Make It Into the Catalog"]

[Text] All kinds of catalogs are a constant attribute of any exhibition, and all the more so of an international air expo. They help visitors orient themselves more quickly in the sea of exhibits, find enterprises and companies producing particular products, and establish communication with their representatives.

Unfortunately few were able to use the catalog for the 1992 Moscow Air Show because of its high cost. Moreover it contained information only about those exhibitors who had the means to pay to have their information published.

The organizers of the first international aerospace expo, which will be held from 31 August to 5 September in Zhukovskiy, in the "Krasnaya Presnya" exhibition complex and at Moscow's Central Airfield, decided to correct this shortcoming. All enterprises, firms, scientific research institutes, design offices and other organizations working in the aerospace field may publish the name of the firm, the nature of its activity, its mailing address and its telephone and fax numbers free of charge in the catalog being prepared for publication. Additional information is printed for a fee.

The catalog is to be published in a large number of copies. Its tentative cost will be within 150 rubles, which will make it possible for practically every participant of the aerospace expo to acquire a catalog.

For information, call:  
261-68-90  
261-68-96  
261-68-35  
Fax: 261-66-08  
945-29-00

### **Better Management of Arms Exports Needed**

**93UM0551A Moscow NOVOYE VREMENYA** in Russian  
No 17, Apr 93 (signed to press 20 Apr 93) pp 18-21

[Article by Petr Vasilyev: "Buy an Aircraft Carrier!"]

[Text] Throughout the 80's right up until the 90's the Soviet Union firmly maintained a position as world leader among countries that export arms. During this time it sold and resold free of charge to various "friendly" regimes arms worth a sum in excess of \$121 billion. The products were exported to 55 countries. The largest buyers were: India—\$18.534 million; Iraq—

\$13.665 million; Syria—\$12.636 million; Czechoslovakia—\$10.089 million; Poland—\$6.663 million; Afghanistan—\$6.608 million; Angola—\$6.251 million; North Korea—\$6.139 million; Libya—\$6.093 million; GDR—\$6.075 million.

But in reality only one-tenth of this sum went into the state treasury. A large percentage of the deliveries were in the form of "fraternal" aid or in the form of long-term and preferential credit, payments for which we have not managed to collect up to now.

The proportional division of the arms flows is expressed approximately by the following ratio: The socialist countries received one-fourth of the deliveries, and developing countries—three-fourths of the overall sum. Along with arms, the Soviet Union sold certain countries the technology for their production. The recipients were Warsaw Pact countries, and also India, Iraq, and China.

Since 1990 the United States has held a strong first place in arms sales. In 1990 the United States together with the former USSR controlled more than 70 of world exports. The United States' share was about 40 percent. The United States sold arms to 98 countries. During the period from 1981 through 1990 a total of \$111.307 million worth of arms were sold. Exports worth \$9.528 million were delivered in 1990 alone.

During the past decade France sold a total of \$33.311 million worth of arms, and Great Britain—\$15.644 million.

### **The Curtain of Secrecy**

Throughout the entire history of the Soviet state this topic has been closed not only to journalists but, paradoxically, also to many statesmen, politicians, and experts. The closed-off, impenetrable world of the military-industrial complex revealed its secrets only to certain individuals. How zealously this information was protected from outside eyes is shown by the fact that neither the USSR defense minister nor the minister of foreign affairs had full knowledge either of the real volumes of arms production or of the scale of their sales. The Soviet Union was the initiator of the idea of arms limitation in the international arena, and the USSR foreign affairs ministers during that time, Eduard Shevardnadze and Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, were unable to answer questions from their Western colleagues regarding the scale of the production and sale of arms.

"We did not know the real volumes of arms sales just as we did not know the full volumes of production of one kind of arms or another. We did not know the precise quantity of arms accumulated in the country and we could not answer questions about how many, where, and what kinds of arms were stockpiled," Bessmertnykh admitted recently. "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs suffered a great deal because of this." Enlightenment and, as the former minister suspects, incomplete enlightenment at that, came during the period of work on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. That

is when they began counting. It turned out that many of the figures were a complete revelation to the country's political leadership, as they were, incidentally, to the military themselves.

The late Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev once noted that even in the post of chief of the general staff he did not know the real scale of arms production. The commander in chief of the combined armed forces of the CIS, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, shared with us: The Ministry of Defense knew, of course, what was being sold, which models of weapons, but it is difficult to say what the volume was." The complete picture was known only at the very top and in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, which played the role of the direct trader in these goods.

In 1990 the former Soviet Union revealed the amount of its defense budget: 17.8 billion rubles [R]. Eduard Shevardnadze in a letter to the UN secretary general promised at that time to give the precise scale of the production and exports of Soviet arms. But no complete information was published on this. Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Igor Belousov, who was in charge of the military-industrial complex, admitted at the end of 1990 that during the period from 1986 through 1990 the USSR exported arms worth a total of more than R56.7 billion. In 1990 the country sold arms worth R9.7 billion and delivered R8.5 billion worth free of charge. But there was not a separate item in the budget for arms exports; money for their production came from defense allocations but the Ministry of Defense never received the money from these sales.

An appropriate question: What then was the real military budget of the former USSR? Marshal Shapashnikov: "I doubt that even now you would be able to find a person who could tell you what the real military budget of the USSR was before 1991. All figures given up to now are phony, and nobody definitely knows a precise figure."

The question of exporting defense products fell completely within the domain of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and particularly one of its administrations—the GIU, the Main Engineering Administration. One of the deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers overseeing the military-industrial complex was directly in charge of sales. The Ministry of Defense never engaged in arms sales. It advertised them, trained foreign specialists, and instructed them in how to use what they bought. Therefore only the leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the Main Engineering Administration can give exhaustive answers to all questions, but even today there is a real unwillingness to speak about this subject. Even if a journalist manages to arrange a meeting with the leaders of these departments, they will tell you, for example, about the frequency of arms deliveries to Abu-Dhabi, they will tell you which kinds of products are exhibited there, which of them attracted the attention of foreign specialists, and so forth, but they will never reveal the statistics and details of sales either in the past or present. At best you will

manage to find out the overall export volumes, which will not allow you to discern the real picture.

#### "Everything Is Being Sold in Succession"

Among career diplomats and the military there is the entrenched opinion that the arms sales in the former USSR and now in Russia are handled by random people. "I would always feel bitter and embarrassed when we would deliver certain models of aviation equipment abroad. The spare parts were of a completely different assortment from what was stipulated in the agreement. This showed that absolutely unqualified people were dealing with this problem. I encountered bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations who sold aircraft and did not know the brand names of aircraft lubricants," says Marshal Shaposhnikov.

The harm from such activity is enormous. At the beginning of the 1980's the USSR sold Iraq several squadrons of MiG-25 aircraft. After training the Iraqis, Soviet flight instructors told the author of this piece, who was working in Iraq at the time, that only a crook or a saboteur could have done this. The MiG-25 was created as a high-speed fighter-interceptor for strategic bombing and was little suited to maneuvering in air combat at low altitudes. In Iraq the MiG-25 was used for no other purpose than the one for which it was least suited. Naturally, the Iraqi command, disenchanted with the aircraft's flight qualities, was glad to accept the French offer to acquire the Mirage-2000 from them.

Russia, as heir the Soviet Union in military questions, unfortunately, has also inherited many of the vices of the unbalanced arms exporting policy. Moreover, a lack of foresight has led to a situation in which the international arms market is now literally dotted with the names of Russian state and commercial structures. They still include the same Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and its affiliates, Oboroneksport and Spetsvneshtekhnika, as well as many other organizations, producers, and intermediaries—even Iosif Kobzon's Moskovit firm. It would seem that we have put an end to the monopolism, but new ills have appeared. The main one is the spontaneous competition that has arisen, and a large part of it is unhealthy. Representatives of the Russian naval command who participated in the recent arms exhibition in Abu Dhabi noted that they had experienced the competitive struggle among three exporters for one and the same project—which one would sell it abroad? Since the spheres have not been divided up, sellers and intermediaries compete among themselves, constantly arguing about who will sell arms and in which form. They also play the price reduction game as they haggle over clients.

Although the question of exporting these products is now being considered in the context of Russia's economic policy, the discussion is extremely one-sided. It is approached as nothing more than an easy source of foreign currency. This is essentially the major argument determining our arms trade. One gets the impression

that the people responsible for exporting arms lack any internal factors to keep their actions in check.

Here is the assessment of a representative of the naval command: "They are trying to sell everything the minute they can grab it from the state. There is no system or planning. They are trying to sell at discounts our latest ships, which we have not even used ourselves."

A lack of discernment in the sphere of trade is fraught with many complications for the seller countries. The fundamental question is what to sell and to whom. You must make sure that you do not get into a situation where your own arms might be used against you. Moreover, the arms market is an extremely conservative thing. Because of the specific nature of the production and the need for its subsequent use, sellers and buyers cooperate with one another over a long period of time and, as a rule, they do not separate. Competition in this market is a normal thing, but it is competition among different producers from different states. The Russian MiG's are quite able to compete with the American Phantoms or the French Mirages. The situation becomes absurd when the MiG's begin to compete with one another. This is the result of actions as uncoordinated as they are energetic on the part of various Russian departments and firms which have now been given the right to trade independently in these goods. The state suffers the main losses here.

#### **A Propitious MiG Has Been Missed...**

The State Commission for Military-Technical Cooperation (GVTS) was created in Russia in 1992 under the chairmanship of Georgiy Khizhi. The commission's task was to monitor the process of arms trade in the interests of the state. It was also to develop a unified Russian policy in the area of arms exports. And is not the commission's fault but its misfortune that it was forced to battle the partisan methods of Russian arms traders. It cannot be ruled out that the Russian government will ultimately limit the number of special exporters. There have been repeated warnings about this recently. It is most probable that their number will be limited to five or six foreign trade firms of large branch corporations. To some people this measure might seem rather harsh—they might say they are being dictated to again. But it is time to replace the anarchy with a civilized form of conducting state affairs.

The chaos that prevails in this sphere now will lead to a loss of profitable transactions. Increasing the number of exporters stirs up competition among them, which automatically leads to a reduction in arms prices. Exports should be effective. A clear example is the now practically dead transaction for the sale of MiG-29 aircraft to Malaysia. The battle among the four Russian structures—the producer and four intermediary firms—for the right to sell the aircraft on the same market has led to a loss of the market itself along with significant other

losses and has damaged Russia's reputation as an arms exporter. Incidentally, the Americans immediately turned up in Malaysia.

In 1991 the volume of arms sales decreased from \$12-13 billion a year to \$3.7 billion. Of course, among the causes and consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union was the violation of economic relations and the willful actions of the former minister of foreign economic relations, Petr Aven. His elimination of the previous departmental specialization of Russian firms trading in arms also led to a situation where everyone who could get their hands on them wanted to trade in these products.

It is no secret that the majority of countries are not producers of arms and, naturally, will continue to buy them. It was also predictable that the largest exporters are members of the UN Security Council, countries with the most developed industry. As we know, the market, and especially this one, will not tolerate a void. If one seller leaves it, his place is immediately taken by another. In particular, this is what happened with domestic exports of this commodity after the collapse of the Union. We were crowded out by the Americans, French, and British.

#### **Trading, But Not Intelligently**

In arms trade one can distinguish two major approaches: first, where they are sold, and second, what the supplier country gets from this. We shall hope that we have seen the last of the times when we delivered these products free of charge to various regimes who managed to assure us that they too were in favor of socialism. In the opinion of domestic specialists and a number of foreign ones, there should not be several structures engaging in this activity; it is sufficient to have one or two, and the department that exports the arms should be answerable to the country's leaders. Decisions about the sale of one or another kind of arms, as well as to whom the given kind of arms are sold, should be made in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. "The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff develop our military doctrine and determine possible opponents, allies, and neutrals in the event of war. It is beyond any doubt that the Ministry of Defense should influence the policy for arms exports and even have the right to veto it," asserts Shaposhnikov. "But it is not engaged in this trading. That is immoral as far as the armed forces are concerned."

In addition to the purely military-economic issues, it is necessary to see the political consequences of arms trade both for the exporting countries and for the buyers. Consequently, this issue must be coordinated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Only professional diplomacy should determine what is in Russia's interests and what is not as well as what consequences one transaction or another can have for Russia's interests," emphasized A. Bessmertnykh.

### Design Bureaus Left To Fend for Themselves

The collapse of the former USSR as a unified economic space could not but be reflected in the overall picture of arms production and exports. The violation of economic ties led to a 12 percent reduction of the state order to Russian defense enterprises for 1992. This, in turn, caused an outflow of scientific and technical cadres.

Almost 70 percent of the scientific and technical potential from among high-level specialists, mainly designers and scientists, have already left or intend to in the near future. If this tendency continues, by the end of the nineties Russia will not be able to catch up in the area of arms production—the only area where Russia can compete in the international arena. One military-industrial complex director thinks that the country can still "live" for a certain amount of time on old reserves of technical developments which are being introduced or will be introduced in the near future. But the prospects for developments in various design bureaus are extremely small. Simply nobody is financing that kind of research. The design bureaus are being left to fight for survival. Their only hope is to find a foreign partner. Those that turned out to be the most successful are the aviation design bureaus of Yakovlev, Mil, Kamov, and several others which created joint ventures with European and American firms, which enables them to retain their staff and conduct advanced research.

On the other hand, natural selection and the struggle for survival of various design bureaus, which are more severe than any state commission, provide the test for new developments of models of arms and equipment. The strongest survive, those who will be able to prevent Russia from being further crowded out of the world market. After all, it does not make sense to produce first-class aircraft or ships and still be half-starving. This problem requires an immediate solution. The chairman of Roskomoboronprom, Viktor Glukhikh, thinks that Russian defense enterprises could sell \$3-3.5 billion worth of arms this year alone. The leading enterprises have to be given the right to export their arms independently, but under strict state control.

But even this figure does not reflect the real capabilities of Russian enterprises if contacts are set up and the interruptions in raw material deliveries are surmounted. In the opinion of our experts as well as foreign ones, the country could sell \$30-32 billion worth of arms annually.

In other words, arms trade must be transformed from a departmental issue into a statewide one. We must finally develop a precise and clear strategy regarding these issues, a part of which must be to strive for international regulation of these processes.

The problem must be included in the category of the most important state issues. We must begin to prepare an international agreement about this, which would limit or regulate the sale of these products. We must block or at least limit the flows of arms to regions with smoldering

or, worse, blazing conflicts. Hardly anyone would dispute the fact that low-intensity conflicts are not only possible but probable in the future in various parts of the world. The solution to the problem? We must find the golden mean—the ratio between the imperatives of security and economic interests. And, of course, our policy simply must contain the concept of regulating flows of arms sales.

Any transaction must be preceded by two things. First, the receipt of firm guarantees from the purchaser regarding the purposes of the use of the arms. Second, an unconditional rejection of "philanthropy" motivated by ideological considerations.

With the money received from exports we must buy sausage or cigarettes, and at those same defense plants, install equipment and lines for producing consumer goods. Incidentally, this would be the essence of conversion.

### CIS Arms on the World Market

—Negotiations began some time ago between Ukraine and China concerning the sale of the aircraft carrier Varyag (displacement—67,000 tonnes), whose construction is being completed on the docks in Nikolayev. According to certain information, the negotiations have reached an impasse. The Varyag could share the unenviable fate of another nuclear aircraft carrier, the Ulyanovsk (75,000 tonnes), which was sold for scrap right on the dock. The Russian navy is trying to rescue the Varyag and use it to replace one of its aircraft carriers in the Northern Fleet. But so far neither Russia nor Ukraine has the money to complete the ship's construction. India and Argentina figured as possible candidates for purchasing the Varyag but the transaction never took place. Russia is refusing to outfit the Varyag with its electronic equipment, and the installation of Western technical equipment would be an extremely costly affair.

—Russia has sold one of its aircraft carriers, the Minsk, to India for scrap metal. Irreparable problems with the energy system were discovered in the ship, which has been in dry dock in Vladivostok since March 1989. It is assumed that the same fate awaits two more ships of the same class—the Novorossiysk (Pacific Ocean Fleet) and the Kiev (Northern).

—At the end of 1992 the first Russian submarine of the Kilo class was sold to Iran. The ship was based in the Baltic. It completed the crossing over the Mediterranean and Red Seas with a Russian crew on board under the St. Andrew flag. It is expected that two more submarines of the same class will be sold to Iran in the near future.

—Abu-Dhabi has purchased a batch of the latest BMP-3 infantry combat vehicles from Russia. Russia is offering similar vehicles on the world market at prices considerably below world prices.

—The price of the BMP-3 is \$800,000 and the BMP-2—\$400,000. (The prices here and henceforth are quoted from articles in the journals JANES DEFENSE WEEKLY and JANES INTELLIGENCE REVIEW.)

The T-80U tank is valued at \$2.2 million and its predecessor, the T-72S—1.2 million.

The price of the 2S19 152-millimeter self-propelled howitzer is \$1.6 million, and the 2S6M self-propelled antiaircraft complex—\$12 million.

A MiG-29 costs \$12 million, and a MiG-31—45-50 million.

A Kalashnikov automatic goes for \$150-200.

—Russia is offering for sale A-50 aircraft similar to the American AWACS, and India and China could be potential buyers.

—Russian aviation equipment was chosen for the first time to participate in a special test program of U.S. models of arms. As a result of the tests it is being recommended for use in the U.S. Armed Forces. Among this equipment is the K36 ejection seat developed by the Zvezda design bureau, which makes it possible for the pilot to abandon an aircraft at a speed four times the speed of sound.

#### Bureaucracy Hampering Arms Market Sales

93UM0539A Moscow KOMSOROLOSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 29 Apr 93 p 2

[Article by Igor Chernyak: "Will the Ministry of Defense Become a Servicemen's Exchange Outlet?: Nowhere in the World Does the Army Aspire To Bend to its Will the Arms Trade. Russia Is the Exception"]

[Text] "I will be taking away from here \$11 billion." These words of Pavel Grachev, defense minister of Russia, at the Aidex-93 arms and military equipment exhibition in Abu Dhabi flew around the world, the major press agencies quoted them and they were discussed by the press. The minister, however, having delivered the sensational statement, was not about to wait if only for the first million and flew on to Kuwait, where there is no shortage of dollars either.

Two months have elapsed. And here we had recently the Committee of the Russian Federation for the Defense Sectors of Industry discussing the question of "urgent measures to improve Russia's military-technical cooperation with foreign countries."

Following a film on the exhibition in Abu Dhabi, the shortcomings were summed up: from the poor artistic presentation of the exposition of the Russian Federation through the worthless advertising prospectuses. It was agreed that Russian arms and military equipment, while having many pluses, lag behind Western models in the use of computers and radio electronic data channels and

thermal-imaging and nighttime apparatus and in all-weather operability. The possibility of the use of products in countries with a hot climate is frequently not taken into consideration. Our competitors have solved questions of the comfort, safety, and survivability of the equipment better. There is a tendency to lag behind in the sphere of small arms. Employees of foreign trade organizations' inadequate knowledge of market conditions was mentioned also. But the biggest shortcoming, according to Gennadiy Yanpoliskiy, deputy chairman of the Committee of the Russian Federation for the Defense Sectors of Industry, is the fact that "Russia derived practically no commercial benefit from the exhibition in Abu Dhabi" (although the main purpose had been a breakthrough onto the foreign market, it is painful, nonetheless). According to certain data, Moscow cannot boast of the results of recent, less publicized, arms exhibitions—in the Philippines and Argentina and Greece—either.

How can Russia return to the arms market? This question is now being discussed at various levels of state power. At the last meeting of the Interdepartmental Commission for Military-Technical Cooperation (KVTS) leaders of the Ministry of Security, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Economy, and the Committee of the Russian Federation for the Defense Sectors of Industry were summoned to Georgiy Khizha, vice premier of the Russian Federation. Many called the situation an emergency. According to information of the competent authorities, the United States has availed itself magnificently of Moscow's weakness and has created substantial process stock for the future: In 1992 it concluded military contracts totaling \$100 billion—this means money that will be received in future years, it means hundreds of thousands of jobs assured of work up to the 21st century.

In promising Russia multibillion-dollar credit our new friends are at the same time increasingly actively ousting it even from "vital" spheres in which it could earn foreign currency honestly. For example, according to Aleksey Shulunov, leader of the League of Defense Enterprises of Russia, supplies of spares for Russian aviation and radio electronic equipment have been organized by firms of France, Israel, and Italy, and the United States, South Africa, Israel, and France are involved in the modernization of 7,000 passenger and combat aircraft which Russia has sold abroad. Russian enterprises, on the other hand, are at this time sitting without orders and without cash, and the country is losing \$2 billion on the spares alone.

There is no influx of money into the country for weapons—the state is being deprived of billions of dollars with all the ensuing repercussions. Enterprises of the military-industrial complex, which used to receive their percentages, albeit small, are dying also. It seemed to the defense industry employees in 1991-1992 that things could not get worse: the volume of orders of the Defense Ministry had declined more than twofold in the sphere of

production and 40 percent in the field of new-weapon scientific research and development. But, apparently, things are even worse—the government commission for 1993 (supplies to the Defense Ministry and for export) has once again been reduced sharply compared with the past year: by a factor of 2.5 for tanks, by a factor of four for armored fighting vehicles, and by a factor of two for self-propelled artillery, and by 40 percent for aircraft. In January-March, according to G. Yanpolskiy, enterprises of Russia's military-industrial complex did not have a single order and did not sign a single contract.

As a result of this policy the manufacture of military items is on account of the increase in prime costs becoming unprofitable for the enterprises, and their product, uncompetitive on the foreign market. More than 600,000 persons have already left the military-industrial complex. Contrary to the recent upbeat statement of Vladimir Shumeyko, vice premier of the Russian Federation, concerning the long-awaited stabilization in industry, the disintegration and collapse of all that has not collapsed thus far continues in Russia's defense complex.

The reality is such that, of the enterprises of the military-industrial complex, only those which have found an opportunity for working for export can survive. But even this straw is frequently no longer a salvation: More than R20 billion (in 1992 prices) of weapons and military equipment piled up in "defense" last year alone. All these had been made to a commission of the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations for supplies overseas. Sale problems.

What is the reason for this? In the opinion of specialists, there is a number of objective factors. The increased prestige of U.S. weapons following the Gulf war, the sharp intensification of the struggle on the world market connected with the end of the cold war and the reduction in defense spending, Russia's loss of traditional consumers in East Europe, and the United Nations' imposition of the embargo on arms supplies to Iraq, Libya, and Yugoslavia. On top of all this the world market had been glutted by Russian equipment from the former socialist countries and the republics of the CIS, at laughable prices, what is more.

But the West was able in this situation to display flexibility: Instead of military-political cooperation characteristic of the era of confrontation of the superpowers, it rapidly switched to military-economic cooperation and increased the allocation of credit to third world countries for arms purchases. The military corporations are now investing part of the proceeds from the sale of weapons in the development of the industry of the importer countries, selling to those who desire it technology and licenses for independent manufacture, creating joint ventures (the most powerful opposition to competitors is a special subject)....

"The reasons for our failures amount not only to the complex domestic political situation, although, of

course, when Russia's top people are speaking for all to hear about the possibility of civil war, there are few who will venture to conclude a long-term contract with such a country," G. Yanpolskiy believes. "But there is a multitude of other factors also. The absence, say, of a strategy of military-technical cooperation. Or the lack of thought behind the system of exports. It is paradoxical that the developers and manufacturers of arms here have been distanced from the transactions and, consequently, have little interest in their success. For supplies overseas per a government commission an enterprise receives only rubles and on top of that only 15-20 percent of the foreign currency—what use is this? A part has been played also both by the curtailment of preferential credit for export-import transactions involving arms and military equipment and the fact that we have cut back on credit to other states for orders of military products, as distinct from the West....

Only the indolent among journalists have not, it would seem, written about the domination of the bureaucracy in our power structures. For an enterprise to get permission to export arms today there is an incalculable number of reconciliation checkoffs, and when it comes to signatures alone, nine are required—of the president, the government, the KVTS, the Ministry of Defense, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Economy, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. Their collection takes from two to 15 months. Aleksandr Kotelkin, the new chief of the Main Administration for Military-Technical Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, is of a decisive frame of mind, it is true: "I promise to reduce the time taken in making decisions on arms exports to 10 days, given favorable circumstances, and to 45 days at worst."

But even if there is a miracle and 10 days become a reality, this will not resolve all the problems, and the old approaches—the orientation toward military-political cooperation to the detriment of economic interests and the sale of obsolete equipment, when at the time of the creation of joint ventures the Russian side is oriented toward the manufacture of products inferior to those that equip the army of Russia—will continue to predominate. No one in the world behaves this way. And it is not even a question of the amorality of the demands made of the leading designers that they undertake the development of outdated products, fooling those with whom they are working side by side. The main question is who under the conditions of strict competition will purchase products if there are counterparts which are somewhat better?

Particular mention should be made of the position of the main supporter of these approaches—the Ministry of Defense. Pavel Grachev recently sent Georgiy Khizha a letter in which he insisted that the military had been accorded the right to sanction all decisions concerning export supplies of arms and military equipment and to decide with whom to create joint ventures, what should be produced there and of what quality, to determine the

expediency of military-technical cooperation with any country, and to participate in the shaping of the price and the issue of licenses. Ten percent of the currency from each deal, in his opinion, should go into the pockets of the Ministry of Defense. The defense minister explains all this by the interests of the state's security. The bewilderment in this connection of the leaders of defense industry enterprises is understandable here. "Nowhere in the world does the army attempt to bend to its will the arms trade, it is entrusted merely with supplies in the form of noncompensable aid. But our people will soon be selling not only machine guns but also buttons," Viktor Gladkov, deputy general director of the Pleshakov Science-Production Association, said sarcastically. Although what is there to be puzzled about here—the Russian military has long been distinguished by a heightened interest in commerce: its exploits in this field in the newspaper's Criminal News column are carried with depressing regularity.

"Why reinvent the wheel. In the United States there is the simple rule: What's good for General Motors is good for America," Vadim Usov, general director of the Tula Machine-Building Plant, said. "We should afford the manufacturer a chance to go onto the market and choose his intermediaries. The French paid a billion merely for assistance in the 'deal of the century' involving the sale of Leclerc tanks to the United Arab Emirates. Nor would we begrudge them if we knew that the intermediary had earned them."

"As long as that same Oboroneksport pays general designer Kalashnikov \$15 a day, as it did in Abu Dhabi, and gives his cleaner a \$1,000 bonus, and as long as there is a caste system, when some work like negroes, and others, the whites, receive and distribute the profits, nothing will change here," Aleksey Shulunov believes.

...In 1993 the government commission for exports of arms of Russia's military-industrial complex amounted to \$480 million or 10 percent of its export potential. That is, the enterprises have a mass of options for the search for clients, it is simply necessary to untie their hands. The conclusion is obvious, it would seem: The designers and manufacturers should be the main people in the market. Broaden their rights and authorize the conclusion of deals and the signing of contracts—the next thing you know, there would be additional foreign currency in Russia. The defense industry people speak of the need for a system of direct exports, that is, exports by the enterprises themselves over and above the government commission outside of intergovernmental agreements, and the creation of export stocks, from which radio industry, optics, and other sectors not directly participating in the manufacture of the end product would be fed. The role of state structures here would be

more of an organizing one—presentation of the list of countries to which weapons could not be supplied and a list of products whose exports are banned, the issue of export licenses, and determination of products' patent purity.

But the likelihood of the appearance of a majority of these solutions is not, in experts' opinion, great. The arms trade is too tastier a morsel. Too many government officials of all levels are today warming their hands there. It is a question, after all, of deals in the billions of dollars, and even one percent here runs into the tens of millions.

In this connection the forecast is as follows. If events develop according to the present script, the military-industrial complex of Russia will within a few years simply have nothing to sell and nothing to produce it with. The country will gradually change from having been an arms exporter to one that imports them. Understandably, neither the United States nor the European countries nor other competitors are, to put it mildly, against such a scenario. The paradox is that this suits the Russian authorities also, it would seem.

#### **U.S. Purchase of SS-N-22 Antiship Missiles Noted**

93P50226A Moscow KURANTY in Russian 23 Jun 93 p 3

[M. Shch. report: "We Are Arming the Pentagon"]

[Text] A transoceanic military department has become interested in the pride of the former Soviet missile-building establishment (whose heirs are now Ukraine and Russia), the SS-N-22 missile, which is intended mainly to destroy ships. The missile, still known under the English name of "Sunburn," is celebrated for being more effective than the famous French Exocet, one of which sank the British destroyer Sheffield during the Malvinas Islands war. However, the "burn" speeds to its target five times faster, just above the surface of the water, and is practically unstoppable for conventional interception systems. The Americans, who have not yet found an adequate antidote to this missile and who fear that one of them might fall into the hands of, say, Iran, intend to buy a consignment of these wonder-weapons from Russia and Ukraine for about six hundred million. Dollars, of course. The Pentagon then intends to fire these missiles at its own ships in order to develop an effective system to counteract them.

Such is misfortune. The poor transoceanic procurement officers are tired of dealing with our money-grubbing designers and production workers, who all, according to the WASHINGTON POST, extort big bribes. Thus, please note, it is thanks to the greed of our people that an American operation to get hold of USSR military secrets is being spoiled.

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